James A. Garfield once said, “A brave man is a man who dares to look the Devil in the face and tell him he is a Devil”. Major Narain Singh is such a valiant name in the history of Indian Army that has not only earned honour and respect nationally but internationally too.
The love-hate relationship that India and Pakistan share is of global interest now. The boundaries they contest for and the wars they fought have been a history for both of them. Indian war heroes have earned golden words even in enemy’s books. Lion-hearted Major Narain Singh is one such son of Dogra soil whose name re-surfaced in the galleries of brave hearts when Pakistan appointed General Raheel Sharif Rana as the Chief of Army Staff, who happens to be the younger brother of Late Major Shabbir Sharif of 6FF. General Sharif’s appreciation of the Indian soldier’s bravery freshened up the memories of martyrdom in 1971 war. After Pakistan Army Chief General Raheel Sharif Rana tributes to Major Narayan Singh’s valour, Indian media did discuss his bravery but only very superficially and perfunctorily as a half-hearted ritual only, without a due ballad to the warrior on the occasion. However, showering of praises by the author from Pakistan is a true recognition of the courage and valour displayed by the officer who proved his mettle facing the enemy fearlessly with unfaltering, undaunted and unflinching courage at Beriwala Bridge Sector in 1971 Bartle Of Fazilka.
The Dogra brave-heart was born on 19th August, 1936 in Krimachi-Mansar village, some 14 KM North-west of Udhampur town to an army man Thakur Kartar Singh and Smt. Dhan Dei of Bhatyal Rajput clan. Being the eldest son of the family, he was lovingly called Kaku. The diligent boy completed his primary education from Krimachi, middle school from Udhampur and joined Army Boys Company from where began his career in Army. He was much disciplined and hard working besides being a very good artist. His leadership qualities made him distinguished, and earned good books of the senior officers of Army resulting in his getting commissioned in 4 JAT on 30th June, 1963. During the 1965 Indo-Pak war he was sent on deputation to Assam Rifles and was posted in North-East.
It was on 9th Feb., 1966 he got married to Smt. Urmila , a daughter of another Army family and the couple was blessed with a son in 1968.
During 1971, Major Narain Singh's unit 4 Jat got deployed in Fazilka on the western border in Punjab.
Fazilka town is testimony to one of the fiercest battles fought during 1971 Indo-Pak War ; its soil still sings the saga of Major Narain’s bravery. During 1971 in a surprise action, Pakistan made an attempt to capture Fazilka town. However, the grit, determination and courage shown by the brave Indian soldiers thwarted the enemy’s sinister designs and left him with a bleeding nose.
Fazilka, a prominent border town in Ferozepur district, Punjab, lies at the end of a rectangle formed by the international border with a corner resting on the Sulaimanke headworks in Pakistan. These headworks tap the remaining waters of the Sutlej, from where a complex of canals emanate from both side of the river and irrigate sandy tracts of Pakistan.
Defence of the headworks has always been one of the most important commitments of Pakistan’s military planners. Their proximity-1.5 kilometres or so from Indian territory made the area very vulnerable and largely influenced Pakistani concepts of its defence. Pakistan had no choice but to gain some cushion of depth by extending operations into Indian territory at the very outset. This was achieved in 1965 and was likely to be repeated in the next encounter, especially when the initiative for hostilities lay with Pakistan.
Since Pakistan had committed its strike force north of the Sutlej in the general area of Khemkaran in 1965, the importance of Fazilka was later reduced to a local level operation. In 1971, Fazilka assumed a special significance for Indian military planners because of the potential threat posed by Pakistan’s concentration of forces, comprising 1 Armoured Division and one or two infantry divisions opposite in the general area of Montgomery-Okara. This force could be employed to develop thrusts towards the sensitive Indian depth areas of Bhatinda-Faridkot either across the Sutlej between the Hussainiwala and Sulaimanke headworks, in the general areas of Mamdot and Jalalabad, or along the open southern flank in the Ganganagar-Sarupsar area. In either eventuality, Fazilka was an essential pivot at the juncture of two flanks for launching a counter-offensive against an invasion of Indian territory. 67 Infantry Brigade Group under Brig Surjit Singh Chowdhary, an infantry officer, was accordingly allocated for the defence of Fazilka. He was assigned the task of containing the Pakistani bridgehead at Sulaimanke and defending Fazilka at all costs. Chowdhary’s group was housed in improvized accommodation in the Fazilka-Mamdot complexes, and as it had trained in the area it may be assumed that it knew the parameters of the task involved and the local terrain quite well.
His resources comprised three infantry battalions, one field regiment and one medium battery by way of artillery support with connected administrative units. He was, in addition, allotted one independent armoured squadron of Sherman-75s from the Infantry School equipped with obsolete tanks of World War II vintage and of dubious mechanical reliability. To offset this disadvantage, another armoured squadron equipped with T-54 tanks was also placed under his command. Two battalions worth of the Border Security Force were holding BOPs along the border with about two companies in reserve in each case.
Pakistan had 105 Infantry Brigade Group deployed opposite Brig. Chowdhary in defence of the Sulaimanke headworks. Although military intelligence about detailed enemy dispositions was rather scanty, it could be safely assumed that leaving one battalion’s worth in close defence of the headworks the Pakistani commander would endeavour to develop thrusts towards Fazilka so as to extend his bridgehead, preferably from the headworks side. For this operation, he had the offensive potentiality of about two infantry battalions and a squadron or two of armour supported by artillery deployed on the Pakistan side of the Sutlej. In addition, one or two Ranger groups of paramilitary forces deployed on the border could also be employed to support this offensive. Fazilka was a vital communication centre from where road and rail arteries ran to Ferozepur, Malout and Abohar. If it fell into Pakistani hands this would offer options to develop various variables of thrust lines into Indian territory. It was imperative that in any defence plan the security of Fazilka should be assured at all costs.
There were four main approaches to Fazilka from Pakistan. Starting from the north, one from Muazzam running along the Shamsha nullah was the shortest, about six to eight kilometres long the second was along the main road from Sulaimanke to Fazilka with subsidiary parallel tracks, the third along the dismantled railway track from Amruka station, and the fourth from the south along the main Shitriwala-Fazilka track. The countryside was generally flat, with occasional sand dunes under cotton cultivation. The going on the whole was good for tracks and wheels except for the narrow strip near the creek running from BP 259 to Qabul Shah. As a result of the 1965 war experience, an anti-tank obstacle in the form of the Sabana distributary with attendant fortifications was constructed to cover all the approaches from Muazzam. Its alignment was parallel to the international boundary at a depth of about 4,500 to 5,400 metres. In addition, some strongpoints were developed ahead of the distributary to dominate the area between the border and the obstacle. These points were designed to hold out against tank rushes.
To use the Sabuna distributary and its fortifications, the defence of Fazilka had a forward poise on the distributary with three battalions deploying their own forward strongpoints dominate the territory between the border and the main defence line, and with adequate depth to contain any likely penetration of the distributary defences. Since the distributary ran parallel to the boundary, the strongpoints could be supported at the depth mentioned above from the main line of defence ease, and as such had considerable staying power. Infiltration with through the strongpoints could be contained at the ditch line and suitably dealt with in the conduct of battle. This was the original plan, which was changed to conform to higher directions just before the 1971 conflict.
As part of the overall concept of the XI Corps defence plan, Chowdhary was required to organize a fortress defence in the Fazilka sector. He organized the built-up area of Fazilka town into a fortress with about two battalions and put forward 3 Assam as a covering force along with 15 Rajput, less two companies, in the Shatriwala area with about one battalion’s worth of a composite BSF formation. 3 Assam was to man the strong points of Choriwala Chisti, Pakka and Qadir Bakh with one company each and Jhangar with a platoon. Choriwala Chisti and Pakka were developed into formidable company-defended localities with antitank moats and minefields of considerable depth. Battalion headquarters along with one company were to’ man the bridges along the Sulaimanke-Fazilka and Boriwala-Fazilka axes.
The Sherman squadron was deployed to cover the Muazzam approach, with early warning elements of about one platoon’s worth in Muazzam town itself. The T-54 squadron was split up, with the squadron less two troops near Fazilka town disposed southwards, and the two troops located in the Chananwala area. These plans were war-gamed and approved by the corps commander, Rawlley, and the GOC F Sector, Maj Gen Ram Singh. The brigade group moved to Fazilka on 9 October as part of the precautionary measures the Indian Army adopted against pre-emptive action on the part of Pakistan.
In the intermediate period from 9 October to the start of hostilities, Brig. Chowdhary developed his defences by strengthening obstacles, laying mines and similar activities. He was supposed to rehearse various contingencies of counterattacks for a defensive battle. He visited F Sector about 25 October and saw the preparation of bridges for demolition deep in their territory, so defence-oriented were theirr planning and preparations.
Maj. Gen. Ram Singh discussed two of his offensive plans for the capture of the headworks. One envisaged a frontal armour assault along the restricted space between the bund and the Eastern Sidioya Canal funnelling towards the headworks from Pakka, and the other crossing the Sutlej upstream and developing a thrust towards the canal colony from the rear and thence to the headworks. For this contingency planning, he could muster no more than a couple of battalions and an assorted grouping of two to three squadrons of armour. Both these plans were contingent on Pakistan remaining dormant in other parts of the sector, but this could not be the case in view of the limited potions it had.
I told Ram Singh my views after the briefing. I felt both plans suffered from serious drawbacks. The first could perhaps work if the initiative was in Indian hands. But since hostilities were to start on Pakistani initiative it would have been suicidal to attempt such a move along the most obvious approach. The second plan involved crossing the river obstacle into uncharted country full of tall grass and then making a long detour in enemy territory.
This could perhaps work with a larger force than Maj. Gen. Ram Singh could muster, but in the context of the accepted defensive posture and the creation of this attacking force out of troops already utilized in defence it would have seriously weakened the sector, especially when the force across the river could not be expected to restore the lost balance by a timely movement to the sector to meet a counteroffensive from the southern flank.
As war broke out with Pakistan on the 3rd of December, 1971, the Pakistani army entered some 7 kilometers deep into Indian territory through the Sulemanki border. About 1820 hours on 3 December, Pakistan started systematic shelling of all the BSF posts. Although shell bursts could be heard at brigade headquarters, actual information about the areas shelled started coming in about 1830 hours. The war was on. After about half an hour the officer commanding 3 Assam reported Jhangar under attack. Brig. Chowdhary at once ordered his troops to pull back from the position, leaving behind marginal strength to maintain contact with the enemy.
About 1930 hours, he reported that the Beriwala bridge had been attacked, and soon after announced its occupation by the enemy. The defences had fallen rather rapidly as the bridge was held by an ad hoc platoon created with clerks and military transport drivers. The Sabuna distributary defences had been pierced by an ingenious infiltration attack, while our strong points at Pakka and Qadir Baksh were still holding. About 2030 hours, 3 Assam confirmed that the Pakistanis were occupying the distributary from the creek to about 250 yards south of the bridge.
As part of his contingency planning, Brig. Chowdhary ordered the T-54 squadron, less two troops and D Company 4 Jat, to counterattack immediately and throw back the enemy west of the distributary. The counterattack materialized about 2330 hours in between the distributary and the Sabuna drain from the southeast. Some tanks were bogged down between the start line and the objective while three were destroyed by grenades and medium artillery fire. The counterattack was only partly successful in that D Company 4 Jat managed to secure the area of the outfall where the distributary took off from the creek and the bund about 135 metres from there towards the bridge. By midnight, the situation at the bridgehead stabilized, with Pakistan holding approximately 135 metres north and 320 metres south of the bridge. About this time, one troop of T-54s was ordered to move from Pakka to Mandi Hazura Singh.
Since establishing a foothold in the area of the Beriwala bridge had opened the way to Fazilka, and no activity was reported south of Kerian, Maj. Gen. Chowdhary ordered 15 Rajput less two companies to move about 2030 hours to Fazilka and strengthen the fortress defences. The BSF element earlier located along with 15 Rajput were left at Shatriwala under its second in command. Reports of attacks on BSF posts trickled in throughout the night. Some of them were overrun and others were asked to pull back to depth localities on the creek and the distributary. About 2130 hours, some tank noise was heard developing from Dab Wali Sharaq towards Choriwala Chisti and appeared leading to the establishment of a roadblock along the Sulaimanke-Fazilka road. The strongpoint at Pakka was attacked about midnight, and the commander of 3 Assam, fearing his troops would be trapped by the block, ordered the strong points at Pakka, Choriwala Chisti and Qadir Baksh to withdraw to the distributary defences without giving fight. Since most of the troops came back, this proved that the roadblock was only imaginary. In fact, most of the casualties were caused by clashes between our withdrawing troops and those manning the distributary defences.
By the first light of 4 December, when the situation became clear, it transpired that 3 Assam was holding the distributary from approximately 320 metres south of the Beriwala bridge to Kerian with depleted strength as a large number of troops were still missing. All localities west of the distributary, including BSF BOPs, had fallen to the enemy with the exception of Muazzam and three in the Yusuf Bhami enclave. 15 Rajput, less one company, had by then taken over the defence of Fazilka town.
The adverse effect of the initial reverses now started telling on Chowdhary. He ordered the demolition of about 23 bridges along the main and village roads over the Sabuna distributary and the creek. This was done in the early hours of the morning. He ordered the withdrawal of D Company 4 Jat from contact with the Pakistani lodgment area near the Beriwala bridge and halfheartedly moved two platoons of infantry and a troop of Sherman tanks to cover the creek against infiltration. He also 4 Jat, less two companies, to counterattack and ordered eliminate the lodgment by the first light of 5 December.
4 Jat, with a squadron of T-54s less two troops, assaulted the lodgment area about 2130 hours on 4 December from the creek towards Gurmukha Hera village and the right shoulder. Although the village was captured in the first phase of the operation, the attack could not make further headway because-of strong resistance from Pakistani artillery and machine gun fire. The battalion suffered 14 killed, 21 wounded and eight missing in this attack.
Seen from Pakistan, the area around Fazilka is flat. But when Maj Shabbir Sharif, leading 6 Frontier Force’s Bravo company, strode up a hastily built observation tower around the middle of November 1971, he could see an Indian battalion position to be reached by the Beriwala bridge, 7 km inside Indian territory. He sent a Lieutenant forward with a section. They surprised the Indians and took the bridge intact.
That bridge would be returned only at the end of the war, but not before a dramatic shoot-out between Sharif himself and an Indian company commander, Narain Singh. The details of the encounter are still hazy, just like the dust it raised. But we will run with the popular version that even as Sharif shot Narain Singh, the Indian hurled a smoke grenade that seared the Pakistani. Singh was shot, and Sharif was burnt in the face. Singh was out of the battle, though whether he was killed instantly or died being transported to a hospital is vague. Sharif lived to fight another day. But just one more day. He was killed in action from machine gun fire from an Indian tank. An aside is merited here: Shabbir Sharif was awarded Pakistan’s highest wartime honour, the Nishan-e-Haider. Decades later, his brother Raheel Sharif Rana rose to be the army chief, now retired.
In His Citation :- Major Narain Singh, a company commander of 4 JAT was chosen to launch a counter attack a day later and recapture the key bridge which could be used by the Pakistani Army for a strong armor attack. (There was some enemy activity in the south near the Bandiwala bridge on the distributary, but nothing of consequence. The BOPs at Muazzam and north of it were withdrawn. The fortress was further strengthened by the induction of one field-company to compensate for pulling out the Jats for the counterattack.)
In daylight on 5 December, 4 Jat consolidated its hold on Gurmukha Hera and the drain, and to make up for its casualties one of its companies was moved in from Fazilka. On the night of 5/6 December, a determined attack was launched on the Beriwala bridge position by 4 Jat supported by two troops of T-54s and considerable artillery concentrations.
Some leading elements under Maj Narayan Singh managed to reach the objectives and emboldened the battalion commander to give a success signal. But in the ensuing hand-to-hand clash Major Narayan Singh was killed In Action. Some assaulting elements clung to the foothold established on the right shoulder while the rest withdrew to the drain, having suffered heavy casualties.
In Pakistani folklore, it is one of the most talked about battles of 1971 war; one of the few operations glorified in an otherwise despondent time for the nation. It was the battle of Majors-one from each side, both hot-blooded Rajput and fierce-who wrestled for the control of a key bridge which finally ended in hand-to-hand combat. Major Shabbir Sharif, a company commander of the 6 Frontier Force who had already been decorated in the 1965 war, was asked to capture a bridge on the ditch-cum-bund(DCB) near the Indian town of Fazilka which he managed to do on December 3-4 by over running BSF positions on the border. The attack on Beriwala was a crucial Pakistani move on the western front in early December to divert Indian resources from the east where General Niazi’s men were facing a rout.
It was on the evening of 3rd December 1971 that the enemy ,disguised as civilians and under heavy shelling, infiltrated along with fleeing villages of Beriwala into Indian territory and captured Beriwala Bridge on Sabuna Ditch Cum Bundh (DCB). Pakistan attacked the Indian defense with approximately one infantry brigade of 2500 men and 28 tanks. Supported by heavy artillery fire, they captured village Pakka by the dawn of 4th Dec 1971. Thereafter the enemy headed towards Fazilka with tanks and heavy force. Their attacks however, were beaten back with heavy casualties. 4 JAT attacked valiantly from Gurumukhkhera village to prevent the enemy’s advancement further from Beriwala Bridge towards Fazilka. Fierce battle was fought for fourteen days to prevent the enemy from making any further gains. Both sides suffered very heavy losses in hand to hand fight around Beriwala Bridge.
Giving the Pakistani version of the fight, Fazal Muqeem writes: “That night in another counterattack, the Indian tanks closed up to two yards of 6 FF positions after having destroyed all the antitank guns in the area. They were only repulsed by artillery fire and 3.5 Energa grenades. During all these fiercely fought battles, Commander 6 FF, and particularly its B Company led by courageous Maj Shaber Sharif, rose to the extreme heights of bravery and skilful leadership.” Five 8 Cavalry tanks were bogged down here, and four of them were destroyed by enemy artillery and infantry antitank weapons. 4 Jat suffered 19 killed, including one officer, and 45 wounded.
Beriwala bridge stayed with Pakistan till ceasefire. In numerous counter attack attempts 3 Assam & 4 Jat lost a number of gallant soldiers. An estimated count of over 200 officers & jawans were cremated in a collective ceremony in village of Asafwala around 7 kms from Fazilka.This included the body of Major Narain Singh of 4 Jat Regiment who lost his life in the hands of Major Shabbir Sharif in a daring counter attack, The body of the gallant officer was returned with due respect and military honour by Pakistan.
Col (R) Vijay Singh then adjutant of 4 JAT had received the body of Major Narain Singh on 18 Dec 1971. An there is Anil Paba who recounted proudly that Pakistani side treated Maj Singh with respect. They picked up the unconscious Major and were taking him for treatment when he died.
Major Narain Singh was given the gallantry award, "Vir Chakra" for his outstanding courage, leadership and supreme sacrifice. Major Narain Singh is survived by his wife Smt Urmila Bhatiyal and son Dr Narinder Singh.
Later in battlefield Brigadier Chowdhary had compounded three counterattacks by 6 December without making any dent on the Pakistani lodgment. Two of his battalions, 3 Assam and 4 Jat, had suffered heavy casualties and were dispirited. The T-54 squadron, having lost several tanks, was reduced to only troop strength. Most Bops had fallen back. By destroying all the road and foot bridges over the distributary and the creek, Brig. Chowdhary had jeopardised himself and his troops and confined his action to the small area limited between the distributary and the Fazilka defences. The higher command began to cast doubts on Brig. Chowdhary’s ability to handle the battle. It was proposed that he should be deprived of his command, but it was ultimately decided to let him continue rather than demoralize the brigade further. But Maj Gen Ram Singh, the General Officer Commanding is charge, moved to the area accompanied by his artillery adviser, Brig G S Reen, and virtually took over the battle.
Later one POW Maj Majamil Warsi, revealed that Pakistan 105 Infantry Brigade Group, operationally responsible for the area, had no plans to take the Fazilka fortress or do anything else of the kind. Their task was confined to seizing such tactical ground as would improve their defensive posture as part of an offensive defence corps plan. This had been amply achieved for them by the Indian destruction of bridges over the Sabuna distributary, thereby resulting in self-surrender of our offensive capability.
