LARGER THAN LIFE NOT MERELY IN THE PHYSICAL SENSE , GENERAL SAGAT SINH ENJOYS THE REPUTATION OF BEING INDIA'S BEST FIRST FIELD COMMANDER WITH AN INSTINCTIVE FEEL FOR BATTLE.
THE EARLY FALL OF DACCA BEARS TESTIMONY OF HIS "STYLE".
9 DECEMBER 1971 GENERAL SAGAT SINGH GOT 311 BRIGADE HELI-DROPPED ACROSS MEGHNA RIVER. HE WON US BANGLADESH WAR, NATHULA SKIRMISH 1967 AND GOA 1961. WONDER WHO WON US MORE, HIS TALE UNTOLD, HE REMAINS UNKNOWN TO INDIAN SUBCONTINENT.
सन् 1971 के दिसंबर की 16 तारीख. जैसे ही ढाका के रेसकोर्स मैदान में पाकिस्तानी जनरल एएके नियाज़ी ने आत्मसमर्पण किया भारतीय सैनिकों ने उऩ्हें घेर लिया.
तभी भीड़ से एक पत्थर आया और जनरल नियाज़ी को लगा. बड़ी मुश्किल से उन्हें कार में डाल केन्टोनमेंट पहुंचाया गया.
इसके बाद ढाका प्रशासन के इंचार्ज बन चुके जनरल सगत सिंह, जनरल अरोड़ा को छोड़ने ढाका हवाई अड्डे गए.
जैसे ही जनरल अरोड़ा का हैलिकॉप्टर ढलते हुए सूरज की रोशनी में गुम हुआ जनरल सगत सिंह ने अचानक ढाका हवाई अड्डे पर अपने आप को बिल्कुल अकेले खड़ा पाया. उनके साथ सिर्फ उनके स्टाफ़ आफ़िसर्स और कुछ वायरलेस ऑपरेटर्स थे.
जनरल सगत सिंह के एडीसी रहे और बाद में लेफ़्टिनेंट जनरल बने जनरल रणधीर सिंह याद करते हैं, "जब हम ढाका पहुंचे तो सारा शहर सड़कों पर उतर आया था. सड़क के दोनों ओर हमारे सैनिक खड़े थे. लेकिन उनकी समझ में नहीं आ रहा था कि उनको कैसे कंट्रोल करें."
1971 युद्ध के बाद नियाज़ी के आत्मसमर्पण के वक्त पीछे खड़े हैं जनरल सगत सिंह
रणधीर सिंह के मुताबिक़, "लड़कियाँ उनके हथियारों पर फूल डाल रही थीं. उन्होंने अपने घर हमारे सैनिकों के लिए खोल दिए थे. जैसे ही आत्मसमर्पण शुरू हुआ ऑल इंडिया रेडियो के रिपोर्टर सुरजीत सेन ने सबसे बेहतरीन जगह पर कब्ज़ा कर लिया- वो अपना माइक्रोफ़ोन ले कर मेज़ के ठीक नीचे बैठ गए."
वे बताते हैं कि जब दस्तख़त करने की बारी आई तो नियाज़ी ने कहा, उनके पास पेन नहीं है. सुरजीत सेन ने तुरंत अपना पेन निकाल कर उन्हें दिया.
जनरल सगत सिंह के सैनिक जीवन का सबसे बड़ा ब्रेक तब आया जब उन्हें 1961 में ब्रिगेडियर का प्रमोशन देकर आगरा स्थित 50 पैराशूट ब्रिगेड का कमांडर बनाया गया और वो भी तब जबकि वो पैराट्रूपर नहीं थे.
जनरल सगत सिंह की जीवनी लिखने वाले मेजर जनरल वी के सिंह बताते हैं, "उनको उस समय पैरा ब्रिगेड की कमान दी गई जब उनकी उम्र चालीस साल से ज़्यादा थी. पैरा ब्रिगेड की कमान तब तक सिर्फ़ पैराट्रूपर को ही दी जाती थी, किसी इंफ़ेंट्री अफ़सर को नहीं."
"ब्रिगेडियर होते हुए भी उन्होंने पैरा का प्रोबेशन पूरा किया. जब आप इसे पूरा कर लेते हैं तभी आपको विंग्स मिलते हैं जिससे पैराट्रूपर पहचाना जाता है. सगत जानते थे कि जब तक उन्हें विंग नहीं मिलते उन्हें अपनी ब्रिगेड का सम्मान नहीं मिलेगा. उन्होंने जल्द से जल्द अपनी ट्रेनिंग पूरी करने के लिए एक दिन में दो दो जंप तक लिए."
1961 के गोवा ऑपरेशन में जनरल सगत सिंह की 50 पैरा को एक सहयोगी भूमिका में चुना गया था, लेकिन उन्होंने उन्हें दी गई ज़िम्मेदारी से कहीं बढ़ कर काम किया और गोवा को इतनी तेज़ी से आज़ाद कराया कि सभी दंग रह गए.
मेजर जनरल वी के सिंह बताते हैं, "18 दिसंबर को ऑपरेशन शुरू हुआ और 19 तारीख को ही उनकी बटालियन पंजिम के पास पहुंच गई. वहाँ सगत ने ही यह कह कर अपनी बटालियन को रोका कि रात हो गई है. पंजिम आबादी वाला इलाका है. रात में हमला करने से कैजुएलटीज़ हो सकती हैं."
"सुबह उन्होंने नदी पार की. गोवा की सरकार ने पुल वगैरह तोड़ दिए थे. इन लोगों ने एक तरह से तैर कर नदी पार की. स्थानीय लोगों का उन्हें बहुत समर्थन मिला. 36 घंटे में उन्होंने पूरे पंजिम पर कब्ज़ा कर लिया."
जून 1962 आते आते 50 पैरा गोवा का अपना ऑपरेशन पूरा कर वापस आगरा आ गई. तभी आगरा के मशहूर क्लार्क्स शीराज़ होटल में एक दिलचस्प घटना घटी.
जनरल वी के सिंह बताते हैं, "जनरल सगत वहां सिविल ड्रेस में गए थे. वहाँ पर कुछ अमरीकी टूरिस्ट भी थे. वो बहुत ग़ौर से जनरल सगत को देख रहे थे. उन्हें लगा कि वो क्यों उन्हें देख रहे हैं. कुछ देर बाद उनमें से एक शख़्स ने आ कर उनसे पूछा कि क्या आप ब्रिगेडियर सगत सिंह हैं?"
"उन्होंने कहा हाँ, लेकिन आप ये क्यों पूछ रहे हैं? टूरिस्ट ने कहा कि हम अभी अभी पुर्तगाल से आ रहे हैं. वहाँ जगह जगह आपके पोस्टर लगे हुए हैं. आपके चेहरे के नीचे लिखा है कि जो आपको पकड़ कर लाएगा उसे हम दस हज़ार डॉलर का इनाम देंगे.
"जनरल सगत ने कहा ठीक है आप कहें तो मैं आपके साथ चलूँ. अमरीकी पर्यटक ने हंसते हुए कहा कि अभी हम पुर्तगाल वापस नहीं जा रहे हैं."
इसके बाद जनरल सगत सिंह को 17 माउंटेन डिविजन का जीओसी बनाया गया. उनकी इसी पोस्टिंग के दौरान नाथुला में चीनी सैनिकों की भारतीय सैनिकों से ज़बरदस्त भिड़ंत हुई.
1962 के बाद पहली बार जनरल सगत सिंह ने दिखाया कि चीनियों के साथ न सिर्फ़ बराबरी की टक्कर ली जा सकती है, बल्कि उन पर भारी भी पड़ा जा सकता है. जनरल वी के सिंह बताते हैं, "इत्तेफ़ाक से मैं उस समय वहीं पोस्टेड था. जनरल सगत सिंह ने जनरल अरोड़ा से कहा कि भारत चीन सीमा की मार्किंग होनी चाहिए. उन्होंने कहा कि मैं सीमा रेखा पर चलता हूँ. अगर चीनी विरोध नहीं करते हैं तो हम मान लेंगे कि यही बॉर्डर है और वहाँ पर हम फ़ेसिंग बना देंगे."
"जब उन्होंने ये करना शुरू किया तो चीनियों ने विरोध किया. उनके सैनिक आगे आ गए. कर्नल राय सिंह ग्रनेडियर्स की बटालियन के सीओ थे. वो बंकर से बाहर आकर चीनी कमांडर से बात करने लगे. इतने में चीनियों ने फ़ायर शुरू कर दिया. कर्नल राय सिंह को गोली लगी और वो वहीं गिर गए."
"गुस्से में भारतीय सैनिक अपने बंकरों से निकले और चीनियों पर हमला बोल दिया. जनरल सगत सिंह ने नीचे से मीडियम रेंज की आर्टलेरी मंगवाई और चीनियों पर फ़ायरिंग शुरू करवा दी. इससे कई चीनी सैनिक मारे गए. चीनी भी गोलाबारी कर रहे थे लेकिन नीचे होने के कारण उन्हें भारतीय ठिकाने दिखाई नहीं दे रहे थें."
"जब सीज़ फ़ायर हुआ तो चीनियों ने कहा कि आप लोगों ने हम पर हमला किया है. एक तरह से उनकी बात सही भी थी. हमारे सारे शव चीनी क्षेत्र में पाए गए. बाद में सगत सिंह के अफ़सर उनसे नाराज़ भी हुए कि आपने ख़ामख़ा की लड़ाई कर दी."
"हमारे करीब 200 लोग हताहत हुए. 65 लोग तो मारे गए. चीन के करीब 300 लोग हताहत हुए. लेकिन एक चीज़ ध्यान देने लायक थी कि 1962 की लड़ाई के बाद भारतीय सैनिकों के मन में चीनियों के प्रति जो दहशत बैठ गई थी, वो जनरल सगत सिंह के कारण ख़त्म हो गई. भारत के जवान को अहसास हो गया कि वो भी चीनियों को मार सकते हैं. पहली बार वी गेव द चाइनीज़ अ ब्लडी नोज़."
जनरल सगत सिंह के सैनिक करियर का वो स्वर्णिम क्षण था जब उन्हें नवंबर 1970 में 4 कोर की कमान दी गई. इसने 1971 के बांग्लादेश युद्ध में निर्णायक भूमिका निभाई.
जनरल रणधीर सिंह बताते हैं, "अगरतला आकर उन्होंने देखा कि यहां तो कोई इंफ़्रास्ट्रक्चर ही नहीं है. ब्रॉड गेज लाइन 1400 किलोमीटर दूर थी. उन्होंने फिर सब ठीक करने का बीड़ा उठाया. काफ़ी तादाद में इंजीनयर लगाए गए. हमारी किस्मत इस मामले में अच्छी रही कि पाकिस्तानी सेना ने मार्च से अपने ही लोगों के ख़िलाफ़ अत्याचार शुरू कर दिए थे. इसकी वजह से बहुत सारे शरणार्थी त्रिपुरा आ गए थे."
"इन शरणार्थियो की मदद से इंजीनियर्स ने इंफ़्रास्ट्रक्चर खड़ा किया. याद रखें, तकरीबन एक लाख सैनिकों को वहां आना था. करीब तीस हज़ार टन के सैनिक साज़ो-सामान को भी वहां पहुंचना था. 5000 गाड़ियां और 400 खच्चरों की व्यवस्था होनी थी. वहां एक सिंगल लेन रोड थी और पुल तो इतने कमज़ोर थे कि मीडियम रेंज गन भी उसके पार नहीं जा सकती थी."
युद्ध के दौरान जनरल सगत सिंह को फ़्लाइंग जनरल का नाम दिया गया. उनके एडीसी रहे लेफ़्टिनेंट जनरल रणधीर सिन्ह बताते हैं कि जनरल सगत सिंह सुबह छह बजे उठ कर हेलिकॉप्टर में जाते थे. अगरतला हैंडीक्रॉफ़्ट इंपोरियम ने उन्हें एक पिकनिक बास्केट दे रखी थी.
"मैं उसमें कोल्ड काफ़ी और सैंडविचेज़ लेकर चलता था. पूरे दिन जनरल साहब लड़ाई का ऊपर से जाएज़ा लेते थे. कई बार होता था कि जहाँ लड़ाई हो रही होती थी, वहीं वो लैंड कर जाते थे. शाम जब अँधेरा हो रहा होता था तब हेलिकॉप्टर वापस लैंड करता था...फिर वो ऑपरेशन रूम में जाते थे."
"नौ बजे आल इंडिया रेडियो के समाचार सुनने के लिए हम आफ़िसर मेस में आते थे. हम कभी बीबीसी लगाते थे, तो कभी ऑल इंडिया रेडियो. रात दस बजे जनरल सगत सिंह हुक्म पास करते थे मुझे कि कल का कार्यक्रम ये है. आप सब को सूचना दे दीजिए. इसके बाद वो डिनर खा कर रात बारह बजे अपने हट में जाकर सो जाते थे."
इसी तरह के एक हेलिकॉप्टर मुआयने के दौरान जनरल सगत के हेलिकॉप्टर पर पाकिस्तानी सैनिकों ने गोलियाँ चलाईं थीं.
जनरल रणधीर सिंह बताते हैं, "जनरल साहब देखना चाह रहे थे कि कहां-कहां लैंडिंग हो सकती है. हम मेघना नदी के साथ-साथ जा रहे थे. आशुगंज ब्रिज के पास हेलिकॉप्टर पर नीचे से मीडियम मशीन गन का फ़ायर आया. पायलेट बुरी तरह से घायल हो गया. हम लोगों पर जो उसके पीछे बैठे हुए थे, उनके खून के छींटे और माँस के टुकड़े आकर गिरे, जनरल साहब के माथे पर भी एक चोट लगी."
"लेकिन उस हेलिकाप्टर के सह पायलेट ने स्थिति पर नियंत्रण कर लिया और विमान को अगरतला वापस लाने में सफल हो गया. जब हेलिकाप्टर की जांच की गई तो पता चला कि उसमें गोलियों से 64 सुराख हो गए थे. जनरल सगत सिंह पर इसका कोई असर नहीं पड़ा. उन्होंने एक और हेलिकॉप्टर लिया और दोबारा निकल पड़े निरीक्षण पर."
जनरल सगत सिंह को सबसे बड़ी वाह-वाही तब मिली जब उन्होंने चार किलोमीटर चौड़ी मेघना नदी को हेलिकॉप्टरों की मदद से एयर ब्रिज़ बना कर पार किया.
बांग्लादेश युद्ध में जनरल सगत सिंह की कमांड में काम कर रहे लेफ़्टिनेंट जनरल ओ पी कौशिक बताते हैं, "उन दिनों हमारे पास एमआई 4 हेलिकॉप्टर हुआ करते थे. उनमें उन दिनों रात में लैंड करने की काबलियत नहीं होती थी. लेकिन ज़्यादा से ज़्यादा सैनिक मेघना पार कराने के लिए जनरल सगत ने लाइटेड हैलिपैड बनाने का आदेश दिया. आपको अचंभा होगा कि हमने खाली मिल्क कैन में केरोसीन तेल डाल कर रोशनी की. एमआई हेलिकॉप्टरों में एक बार में आठ सैनिक बैठ सकते थे. हमने लगातार सैकड़ों फेरे लगा कर लगभग पूरी ब्रिगेड मेघना के पार उतार दी."
दिलचस्प ये है कि पूर्वी कमान के प्रमुख जनरल जग्गी अरोड़ा ने उन्हें मेघना नदी न पार करने के निर्देश दिए थे. जब वो मेघना नदी पार कर चुके तो उनके पास जनरल अरोड़ा का फ़ोन आया और दोनों के बीच ज़बरदस्त कहा-सुनी हुई.
जनरल कौशिक बताते हैं, "मैं उस समय जनरल सगत सिंह की बगल में ही बैठा हुआ था. कोलकाता से आर्मी कमांडर अरोड़ा का फ़ोन आया कि आपने मेघना नदी क्यों पार की? जनरल सगत सिंह ने कहा आपने मुझे जो काम सौंपा था मैंने उससे ज़्यादा कर दिखाया है."
"इस पर अरोड़ा संतुष्ट नहीं हुए. सगत ने कहा मेरी ये ड्यूटी बनती है कि अगर मुझे किसी कदम से देश का फ़ायदा होता दिखाई देता हो तो मैं वो कदम उठा सकता हूँ. मैंने न सिर्फ़ मेघना नदी पार की है बल्कि मेरे सैनिक तो ढाका के बाहरी इलाके में भी पहुंच चुके हैं. जनरल अरोड़ा ने आदेश दिया, नहीं आप अपने आगे बढ़ चुके सैनिकों को वापस बुलवाइए. सगत सिंह ने कहा मेरा कोई सैनिक वापस नहीं लौटेगा. अगर आप इससे सहमत नहीं है तो आप दिल्ली तक ये मामला पहुंचाइए. इसके बाद सगत सिंह ने गुस्से से फ़ोन रखते हुए कहा वो मुझसे सैनिक वापस बुलाने के लिए कह रहे है... ओवर माई डेड बॉडी."
इतना सब कुछ करने के बाद भी जनरल सगत सिंह को कोई वीरता पुरस्कार नहीं दिया गया. उन्हें सिर्फ़ भारत का तीसरा सबसे बड़ा नागरिक सम्मान पद्म भूषण ही मिला. और तो और उनका प्रोमोशन भी नहीं हुआ.
मेजर जनरल वी के सिंह बताते हैं, "ये बहुत दुख की बात है कि 1971 की लड़ाई में जिनका प्रदर्शन सबसे अच्छा था. उन्हें कोई वीरता पुरस्कार नहीं मिला. तमाम लोगों को वीर चक्र और महावीर चक्र मिले, लेकिन सगत सिंह को नहीं मिला. दूसरे उनको प्रमोशन भी नहीं मिला. आर्मी चीफ़ न सही उनको आर्मी कमांडर तो बनाया जा सकता था. शायद इसकी वजह ये रही हो कि उनकी अपने ऊपर के अधिकारियों से अक्सर नोक-झोंक होती रहती थी."
रिटायर होने के बाद जनरल सगत सिंह ने अपना जीवन जयपुर में बिताया.
उनकी पौत्री मेघना सिंह कहती हैं, "मेरे दादाजी एक ऐसे इंसान थे जिन्हें आप भीड़ में मिस कर ही नहीं सकते. वो छह फ़ीट तीन इंच लंबे थे. भारी आवाज़ थी उनकी. बहुत ही सौम्य. उनसे कोई भी बात कर सकता था. हम लोग हॉस्टल में रहते थे. जब हम छुट्टियों में घर आते थे तो वो हमारे फ़ार्म हाउस में उगने वाले फलों आम और चीकू को हमारे लिए करीने से प्लेट में काट कर हमारा इंतज़ार करते थे. खाने की मेज़ पर टेबिल मैनर्स के वो बहुत कायल थे. जयपुर में जब पहला पित्ज़ा हट खुला तो वो ही हमें पहली बार वहां लेकर गए थे."
जनरल सगत सिंह को भारत का सबसे निर्भीक जनरल माना जाता है. उन्होंने न सिर्फ़ कई ऑपरेशनों में जीत हासिल की बल्कि उस सबसे कहीं ज़्यादा काम किया जितना उन्हें करने के लिए दिया गया था. भारतीय सेना में उनको वही मुकाम हासिल है जो अमरीकी सेना में जनरल पैटन और जर्मन सेना में रोमेल को हासिल था.
उनके साथ काम कर चुके जनरल ओ पी कौशिक बताते हैं, "मैंने कई लड़ाइयां लड़ी हैं. 1962 में भारत चीन युद्ध के समय मैं कैप्टेन था. उसके बाद 1965 और 1971 के युद्ध में भी मैं था. सियाचिन और कश्मीर में भी मैं जनरल आफ़िसर कमांडिंग रह चुका हूँ. अपने अनुभव के आधार पर मैं कह सकता हूँ कि मेरे विचार से भारतीय सेना का बेस्ट फ़ील्ड कमांडर जनरल सगत सिंह हुआ है."
"वो डिस्ट्रीब्यूशन करने यानी लोगों को ज़िम्मेदारी देने में बहुत तेज़ थें. वो काम को डिसेंट्रिलाइज़ करते थे और अपने जूनियर्स पर पूरा भरोसा देते थे. उनमें मोटिवेट करने की भी बहुत ज़बरदस्त भावना थी. अगर कोई ग़लती हो जाती थी तो वो इसके लिए जूनियर को ज़िम्मेदार नहीं ठहराते थे बल्कि उसे खुद सुधारने की कोशिश करते थे और अक्सर उस ग़लती को अपने ऊपर ले लेते थे."
'General J S Aurora, the commander of the Indian forces in the East, asked General Sagat Singh to withdraw his troops who were on the move to Dacca -- but he refused.'
'He said, "Jaggi, over my dead body".'
'Therefore, I say the creator of Bangladesh was General Sagat Singh.'
Lieutenant General O P Kaushik salutes the incredible soldiers who turned the tide in the 1971 War.
Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, PVSM (14 July 1918 – 26 September 2001) was a three-star General in the Indian Army notable for his participation in liberation of Goa and later in Bangladesh. He held many prestigious command and staff appointments throughout his military career.
Initial Life
Lt. Gen. Singh was born in a Rajput Family at a small Village - Kusumdesar (Moda) in Churu district of Rajasthan on 14.7.1919 to Hon. Capt. Brijlal Singh Rathore of Kusumdesar and Jadao Kanwar of Hadla. Eldest among three brothers and six sisters he completed his schooling from Walter Nobles High School at Bikaner in 1936. He joined Doongar College at Bikaner but was enrolled as a Naik in Bikaner Ganga Risala after his intermediate exam in 1938. Later, he was promoted to Jamadar (Nd Subedar) and commissioned as 2/Lt in Bikaner Ganga Risala which was sent to Sindh in 1941 to deal with Hoor rebellion. Later it was sent to Jubair in Iraq and Ahwaz in Iran during the war. He was selected for the 12th War Staff course at Quetta from May to Nov 1945.
Marriage and personal life
He married Kamla Kumari on 27 January 1947; Kamla was daughter of the Chief Justice of J&K Richhpal Singh. Sagat had four sons: Ranvijay Singh, Digvijay Singh (born 1950), Veervijay Singh (born 1954) and Chandravijay Singh.
Gen Sagat Singh, the hero of the 1971 war, was a military genius who never lost against any enemy, including the Chinese. His famous words: “I don’t know what fear is.” Here are memories of the man born in a Churu village of Rajasthan
Some of the best stories are told by soldiers.
They will tell you of hard fought battles that have become the stuff of legend.
They will remember each and every name -- of the men they fought alongside and of the places they conquered.
They will reminisce about men who displayed exemplary courage that will give you goose bumps; and they will speak with pride of the jawans they trusted with their lives.
In the life of our young Republic, the cold month of December brings each year — since 1971 — the warm memories of the war for the liberation of Bangladesh. The war that month that year was a principled victory on a foreign soil of which any nation can take genuine and enduring pride. In a larger sense, it was not India’s war — it was an unprecedented unjust human conflict thrust upon us. And, in a way, it was India’s war. It was our armed forces’ and our uniformed services’ war. Among the known men and women who brought us glory are the well-known heroes who were deservingly decorated with medals and commendations. There were able military personnel led by the three eminent service chiefs. All these, combined with the scintillating political leadership of Indira Gandhi, are rightly part of the folk lore of our national life.
There is also one not-so-well-known hero of that war. His role became a major factor in the quick and decisive victory. Yet he was neither adequately decorated nor given his due. He was rather made to fade out in humiliation. We are talking of Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, the then General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Tezpur-based 4 Corps.
After a long tenure of three years, Sagat was promoted Lieut General in November 1970, and given command of 4 Corps, which had its headquarters at Tezpur. This was his third tenure in the East, in succession. By this time, Sam Manekshaw had taken over as COAS, and it was again at his behest that Sagat was chosen for this assignment. It proved to be a serendipitous choice, since 4 Corps, under Sagat's command, was to play a pivotal role, a year later. The liberation of Bangla Desh in 1971 was one of the Indian Army's finest hours. The lightning campaign, lasting just fourteen days, resulted in the total annihilation of Pakistani forces, and a magnificent victory for India. There were many acts of valour, and of fortitude in the face of adversity. Units and sub units fought with courage, dash and elan, and there was not a single reported incident of loss of morale, or cohesion. More than individual or collective gallantry, the unique feature of the campaign, and the one that proved decisive, was the quality of military leadership. Among the leaders whose contribution to the success of the operation was significant, was Sagat Singh. In fact, it was in 1971 that Sagat displayed, for the last time, his skills as a tactician, and conclusively proved his worth as a combat leader par excellence.
The task of liberating Bangla Desh, then called East Pakistan, was given to Lieut General Jagjit Singh Aurora, GOC-in-C Eastern Command. Under him, he had 2 Corps, commanded by Lieut General (later General) T.N. Raina; 33 Corps, commanded by Lieut General M.L. Thapan; 4 Corps, commanded by Lieut General Sagat Singh; and 101 Communication Zone Area, commanded by Major General G.S. Gill. The terrain in Bangla Desh was riverine, which favours the defender. The rivers were interspersed with rice fields and marshes, which made cross country movement very difficult, especially after the monsoons. Major troop movements had to be confined to the roads, and ferries or bridges over the rivers, if defended, or destroyed, could hold up advancing columns for long periods. Inland water transport was also used, for transportation of goods. Pakistan had three infantry divisions, comprising about 42 battalions of regular troops, and five squadrons of armour, for the defence of the region, and more than 2000 kilometres of border. Lieut General A.A.K. Niazi, who was commanding the Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army, had appreciated that the Indian advance would have to be along the major road axes, and had deployed his troops accordingly. Strong points had been created along the likely axes, and it was visualised that unless these were cleared, the advancing enemy could make little headway. This proved to be a costly mistake.
The territory in East Pakistan is divided by major riverine obstacles into four distinct parts. The first part comprised all territory East of the Meghna river, including Sylhet, Brahman Baria, Comilla , Noakhali, Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar; the second comprised the territory between the rivers Jamuna (Brahmputra) to the East and Padma (Ganges) to the West, including Rangpur, Bogra and Rajashahi; the third comprised territory West of the Padma, including Kushtia, Jessore and Khulna; and the fourth was the Dacca Bowl, surrounded by rivers on all sides - the mighty Meghna and Lakhaya to the East, the confluence of Meghna and Padma to the South, Padma and Burhi Ganga to the West, and a branch of the Jamuna, which joins the Meghna, to the North. Due to its geostrategic importance, Dacca had always been chosen as the capital by successive kingdoms.
The task allotted to Eastern Command by Army HQ was to destroy the bulk of Pakistani forces in the theatre, and occupy the major portion of East Pakistan. The capture of Dacca was not included in these instructions. Based on this, Eastern Command evolved its operational plan, and allotted tasks to its subordinate formations. 2 Corps was given the task of advancing from the West and capturing all territory West of the river Padma; 33 Corps was to advance from the North West and capture all territory upto the confluence of the Padma and the Jamuna; and 4 Corps was to advance from the East, and capture all territory East of the river Meghna. The task of capturing the area of Mymensingh, between the Meghna and Jamuna rivers, was allotted to 101 Communication Zone Area.
Though this had not been spelt out in the instructions issued by Army HQ, Sam Manekshaw had visualised that after all three corps had achieved their tasks, re-grouping would be carried out, and forces launched for the capture of Dacca from the West, after crossing the Padma at Golundo Ghat. For this re-grouping, 4 Corps was to shed 23 Mountain Division, all its medium artillery, and two squadrons of PT-76 tanks. In the event, 2 Corps could not cross the Madhumati, and 33 Corps could only reach Bogra. As a result, the re-grouping did not take place. Dacca was captured purely by chance, by forces which had never been intended to reach there.
The operation commenced on 4 December 1971, after Pakistan launched air strikes on a number of Indian airfields, in the early hours of the morning of the previous day. According to plan, 2 Corps entered East Pakistan from the West, 33 Corps from the North, and 4 Corps from the East.
Under Sagat's command in 4 Corps were three mountain divisions, with their normal complement of supporting arms and services. In addition, he had been allotted two ad hoc squadrons of light PT-76 tanks, and a medium battery of 5.5 inch guns. The divisional commanders were Major General (later General) K.V. Krishna Rao (8 Mountain Division); Major General R.D. 'Rocky' Hira (23 Mountain Division); and Major General B.F. Gonsalves (57 Mountain Division). The main task given to 4 Corps was to destroy Pakistani forces East of rivers Meghna and Bulai.
Sagat decided to send in three divisional thrusts, across the 250 kilometre stretch of border on which his Corps was deployed. In the North, 8 Mountain Division was to advance along the line Dharmanagar-Kulaura-Maulvi Bazar, and head for Sylhet; 57 Mountain Division was to advance along the axis Akhaura-Ashuganj, and capture Daudakandi; and 23 Mountain Division, in the South, was to capture Maynamati, Comilla and the major river port of Chandpur. Subsidiary tasks were allotted to 61 Mountain Brigade Group and Kilo Force, to assist the Corps operations. There was a rail bridge over the Meghna at Ashuganj, but the road alignment did not follow the railway. Though not spelt out in the Corps Operation Orders, Sagat was determined to 'bounce' the river, in case the opportunity presented itself, and race for Dacca.
In November, a number of preliminary operations had been carried out, with the aim of removing Pakistani elements which could interfere with the advance, once it began. A Pakistani post at Dhalai was cleared by 61 Brigade, after two attempts, and some casualties. The Belonia bulge, a tongue of Pakistani territory which jutted about 10 kilometres into Tripura, and was a constant irritant, was cleared by 23 Mountain Division. A Pakistani post at Atgram, on the North East approach to Sylhet, had to be eliminated by 59 Brigade, after heavy fighting.
Operations started on night 3/4 December 1971. In the North, 81 Mountain Brigade secured Shamshernagar, and 59 Mountain Brigade captured Ghazipur, followed by Kulaura, on 6 December. The same day, 81 Brigade captured Munshi Bazar. In this sector, Maulvi Bazar was held by a Pak brigade, which was occupying a strong defended position on a prominent high ground. From the very beginning, Sagat tasked the Hunter aircraft, operating from Kumbhigram airfield, to constantly bomb Maulvi Bazar with napalm. He appreciated that this would prove very costly to the Pak brigade, in terms of casualties, and break their morale. At this stage, Sagat was informed by intelligence sources that the Pakistanis were pulling out of Sylhet, in a bid to reinforce Ashuganj.
Sagat saw in this an opportunity to seize Sylhet, and decided to do so by a heli-borne operation. On 7 December, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles were landed South East of Sylhet, by a special heli-borne operation. This so unnerved the Pakistani Command that the Maulvi Bazar brigade group was moved away to Sylhet, which already had a brigade group, of four battalions. This was reported by the Air Force, which flew a tactical reconnaissance mission over Maulvi Bazar next day. Sagat immediately ordered Krishna Rao to occupy Maulvi Bazar, which he did. In a Pakistani officers mess, they found lunch laid on the table, uneaten.
This was the first time an 'air bridge' had been employed by the Indian Army. Being a paratrooper, Sagat knew the potential of a heli-borne force, and could appreciate the immense advantages that accrued from its employment, at the opportune moment. The enemy was demoralised, and made no efforts to attack 4/5 Gorkha Rifles. As he had visualised, the noise of the helicopters misled the Pakistanis, and they over estimated the strength of the troops who had landed by helicopter. By resorting to a clever, unorthodox ploy, Sagat was able to capture Maulvi Bazar without a shot being fired.
In the Central Sector of 4 Corps, 57 Mountain Division commenced its advance with two brigades. 73 Mountain Brigade, under Brigadier M.L. Tuli, went for Gangasagar, while 311 Mountain Brigade, under Brigadier Misra attacked Akhaura. It was during the battle for Gangasagar, which was captured after a stiff fight, that the only PVC of the Bangla Desh campaign was won by Lance Naik (a naik is the Indian equivalent of a corporal) Albert Ekka, of 14 Guards. Akhaura also fell on 5 December, to 4 Guards and 18 Rajput, of 311 Mountain Brigade. At this stage, it was reported by patrols that one pair of lines of the double track railway line running to Brahmanbaria had been removed, making it usable by vehicles, and that the captured bridge over the Titas was intact. Sagat promptly changed the task of 57 Mountain Division, and ordered it to make for Ashuganj, by way of Brahmanbaria, instead of going for Daudkandi. This was a crucial decision, and led to a quickening of the operations of 4 Corps, and its crossing of the Meghna.
Brahmanbaria, in the loop formed by the river Titas, was strongly defended. However, the Pakistani troops holding it were expecting a frontal assault, from the South East, and when 73 Brigade sent columns to the West and South, they evacuated the town, and began to withdraw towards Ashuganj. 311 Brigade of 57 Division pursued the withdrawing enemy, upto the East bank of the Meghna, and the leading elements of 57 Division contacted Ashuganj on December 9. At Ashuganj, the Pakistanis were well dug in, and not prepared to give up without a fight. They let the Indian troops enter the built up area, and then opened up. The Indians were taken by surprise, and had to fall back, after suffering heavy casualties, and losing four tanks. The Pakistanis also blew up the bridge over the Meghna, leaving the Pakistani brigade commander and some troops on the East bank of the river.
At this stage, it was clear to Sagat that the enemy was in desperate straits. Having blown up the Ashuganj bridge, he intended to fall back across the river, and hold Bhairab Bazar, with whatever little he had left. Chandpur and Daudkandi had also fallen, and Pakistani resistance in the Eastern Sector had almost ceased to exist.
Sagat flew over Daudkandi, Chandpur and Ashuganj in a helicopter on 9 December, and discussed the situation with the local commanders. He then decided to heli-lift his troops across the Meghna, and make for Dacca. He appreciated that the capture of Dacca would end the war, and the only way to achieve this was to contain Bhairab Bazar, and cross the Meghna further to the South, where no opposition was expected. He had twelve MI-4 helicopters, and he reckoned that the element of surprise would more than make up for the deficiency in numbers, that he would be able to get across. He had used helicopters in Mizo Hills for the last three years, and knew their worth. He had planned for such a contingency, if the opportunity presented itself, and had practised his troops and helicopter pilots for night landings, using torches. Fortunately, Gonsalves, who was commanding 57 Mountain Division, was also a pilot, and well versed in their use, in Mizo Hills, where his division had been deployed. Sagat had also commandeered several steamers from the river port at Chandpur and the Titas river, and these had been fuelled and positioned, for the crossing.
The air lift began on the afternoon of December 9, and continued for the next 36 hours. A total of 110 sorties were flown, from the Brahmanbaria stadium, and crossed the Meghna, which was 4,000 yards wide, to land at helipads which had been marked by torches, with their reflectors removed. During day, the troops were landed in paddy fields, with helicopters hovering low above the ground. The first battalion of 311 Mountain Brigade, 4 Guards, was landed in Raipura. while 9 Punjab crossed the river using country boats. Next day, the troops were landed directly at Narsingdi. Meanwhile, 73 Brigade had started to cross, using boats, which had been rounded up. The ferrying of artillery and tanks was a serious problem, and required considerable ingenuity on the part of the Engineers. By 11 December, both 311 and 73 Mountain Brigade had crossed the Meghna, and were ordered to advance to Dacca, on different axes. Using all modes of transport, including bullock carts and cycle rickshaws, both brigades advanced rapidly, and on December 14, the first artillery shell was fired on Dacca. On 15 December, 311 Mountain Brigade was poised to enter Dacca, when orders were received from HQ Eastern Command to halt further advance. Tactical HQ 101 Communication Zone Area, 95 and 167 Mountain Brigade Groups, and 2 Para were placed under command 4 Corps the same day. On night 15/16 December, Dacca was subjected to shelling by Sagat's artillery, and this hastened the surrender. On December 16, the cease fire was declared.
In the Southern sector of the Corps, 23 Mountain Division commenced its advance towards Comilla, and the Lalmai Hills. On December 4, 301 Brigade captured over two hundred prisoners of the 25 Frontier Force, including the battalion commander, near Comilla. Simultaneously, 181 Brigade cut the road and rail line between Laksham and Lalmai, enabling 301 Brigade to capture Mudfarganj, on December 5. The Pakistanis made an attempt to re-capture the town on December 7, but failed. Comilla was taken on December 8, and so were Daudkandi ferry site and the major river port of Chandpur. The brigade group garrison at Laksham, comprising four battalions, had been encircled by December 8. It disintegrated and headed for Maynamati on 9 December. Almost a thousand of these were captured, before they could reach the brigade group defences based on Maynamati, which was heavily defended, and defied capture, till the cease fire, and surrender on December 16.
As had happened in the operations for the liberation of Goa, it was not the main column, but a subsidiary thrust which claimed the final prize. In Goa, Sagat's 50 Para Brigade had a secondary role, but he managed to reach Panjim before the troops of 17 Mountain Division. In the Bangla Desh operations, 2 , 4 and 33 Corps constituted the main thrusts, while 101 Communication Zone Area had been assigned a complementary role, in the Mymensingh-Tangail area. Ultimately, it was this column which managed to reach Dacca first, and won the race. However, this was made possible only by the operations of 4 Corps, in crossing the Meghna, and the minor rivers of Balu and Satlakhya, and its imminent entry into Dacca. 120 Pak Brigade, which was facing 101 Communication Zone Area, was hurriedly withdrawn for the defence of Dacca, after the crossing of the Meghna. The Pakistanis had prepared defences around Dacca which had been christened 'Fortress Dacca'. Pak 120 Brigade disintegrated after occupation of Tungi by 73 Mountain Brigade of 57 Mountain Division. Niazi's predicament can be gauged from the fact that he had to employ 'walking wounded' from military hospitals, to occupy positions on the perimeter of 'Fortress Dacca'.
The rapid advance of 101 Communication Zone Area, under the command of Major General G.S. Nagra, who had replaced Major General G.S. Gill, after the latter was wounded, was also facilitated by the para drop at Tangail, on 11 December. On that day, 4 Corps was in Narsingdi, 35 Km from Dacca, while the leading elements of 95 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier H.S. Kler, were in Jamalpur, 160 Km from Dacca. Two days later, on 13 December, 95 Infantry Brigade and 2 Para were still at Tangail, almost 100 Km from Dacca, while Sagat's troops had reached the Satlakhya river, and were just 10 Km from Dacca. Nagra was lucky to find a tarmac road running South, a few miles West of Safipur, which led to Dacca via Sabhar, without having to cross the water obstacles of Turag and Dhaleshwari. Even at midnight on 14 December, when 95 Infantry Brigade was still on the Turag river, elements of 57 Infantry Division of 4 Corps had crossed the Satlakhya, and had started shelling Dacca. Sagat would have reached Dacca first, but this honour went to Nagra, though the latter had been placed under Sagat's command on 15 December, and hence technically was part of 4 Corps when he entered Dacca. Though Nagra was the first across the finish line, in the race for Dacca, the real winner was undoubtedly Sagat. If the Pakistanis had not surrendered, there is no way 101 Communication Zone could have taken Dacca earlier, since it would have required a major assault. Since Sagat had firmed in at Narsingdi, and already planned the attack for December 16, in all likelihood the honour of taking the city would have gone to him. That he lost the chance does not in any way detract from his brilliant performance. Sagat was also anxious to avoid entering the built up area of the city, where the Pakistanis would have an advantage.
General Sagat Singh, the hero of the 1971 war and the military genius who never lost against any enemy, including the Chinese.
When Dacca (now Dhaka) fell, the Indian Army found a dossier of a father prepared by the Pakistani Army which mentioned that Sagat Singh is the Indian general who should be feared most as he had never lost any battle against any enemy anywhere. What a tribute from an enemy!
Despite getting injured by the machine-gun fire, successfully conducted the very daring, hitherto unknown night-time heli-borne operations over the rivers and the treacherous terrain, which made the fall of Dacca possible so quickly and decisively, leading to the surrender of 93,000 Pakistani Army personnel.
After the Instrument of Surrender was signed on December 16, 1971 — two days and 45 years ago — Indira Gandhi visited Dacca and profusely thanked General Sagat Singh, and saw to it that he stayed in Dacca — a la General Douglas MacArthur in the post-World War II Japan — to assist the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman government.
As India marks 45 years of the 1971 War, Lieutenant General O P Kaushik, (retd), who fought in the campaign in the Eastern Theatre, shared some such memories with Rediff.com's Archana Masih.
These are real stories about men from the 61 Brigade who fought hard to outwit and vanquish the Pakistan army.
Of brilliant military manouvers under the leadership of an outstanding field commander -- and their incredible march to Dhaka.
Of men who remained calm even when outnumbered by the enemy.
Of officers who defied their superiors when surrounded by the enemy, but went on to save the day.
From Mizoram to Silchar, the troops move for war
When war was building up lt. Gen kaushik(author) was posted with the 61 Brigade tasked to control the rebellion in the Mizo hills.
The Mizo rebellion for an independent country had started in 1966. The rebels were being assisted by both China and Pakistan. (Mizoram became a Union Territory in 1972 and was granted statehood in 1987.)
We moved to Silchar about 6 months before the war and were tasked to train the Mukti Bahini, highly committed college students who had revolted against the excesses of the Pakistan army.
In each training camp there were about 1,500 students. The boys were a big asset; they knew the exact location of the Pakistani forces, their strength, terrain, routes and roads.
Units of the Pakistan army's East Bengal Rifles Regiment -- which comprised only Bengalis from East Pakistan -- had also revolted and established camps in India.
It was decided that we would go to war after the monsoon because East Pakistan was like an open sea in the rains. The flooded paddy fields in the countryside would make military manouevers difficult. Hence, December was chosen.
Just before the start of the war, the border (with Pakistan) which is held by the Border Security Force and is under the home ministry was placed under the army.
We used BSF units in Agartala and Tripura to gather intelligence about Pakistan.
The Indian Army had committed three corps for the war. One corps has 80,000 to 90,000 troops.
We were part of the Tezpur-based 4 Corps, primarily responsible for the China border in Arunachal Pradesh. We were giving the task of attacking from the east and capturing territory up to the Meghna river -- we were not to cross the Meghna.
Meghna is a tributary of the Brahmaputra. It is a big river. In the monsoon you can't see from one bank to the other.
2 Corps was launched from the west in Calcutta and tasked to liberate territory up to the Ganga river.
33 Corps from the north was ordered to liberate territory up to the Padma river.
Dacca was not the objective. The aim was that India would announce the formation of the Bangladesh government in one of these three enclaves.
THE ASSAULT ON FORMIDABLE COMILLA
Lt. Gen. Kaushik was a brigade major of the 61 Brigade and in our task of liberating territory up to the east bank of the Meghna river, we had to move towards a major Pakistan army cantonment called Comilla.
It was a hill feature about 14 km long which had been developed into a beautiful cantonment. Pakistan had prepared their defences in those hills. They thought since the terrain was riverine, India would take the road and hence they were primarily guarding the road access.
But it was decided that the initial advance into East Pakistan would be cross country.
We were told to go on foot through 24 kilometres of paddy fields and cut off the highway from Dacca to Chittagong which passed through Comilla. Chittagong was a major port.
Since the border was held by small pockets of Pakistni troops, we needed some place to infiltrate without Pakistan knowing it.
So they attacked 14 kms away on their left edge with 14 tanks and one infantry battalion of 1,000 soldiers. A massive battle took place for 3 days, south of Comilla. The Pakistanis thought that the attack had come, but this was not our main attack.
The main assault was yet to come.
How Indian troops broke through a heavily fortified Pakistani cantonment
The panic-stricken Pakistan army withdrew its forces north of Comilla. We received this information at midnight from the Mukti Bahini and BSF -- and 12 Kumaon launched an attack.
The Maynamati hill (where Comilla was situated) was attacked from the north because Pakistan had already vacated that area in panic. They were taken by surprise and realised that the attack from the south was not the real one.
The attack was so severe from both north and south that in spite of holding this feature on a low hill with a full brigade -- the Pakistanis thought that a division of the Indian Army had attacked! (3 to 4 units make a brigade; 3 to 4 brigades make a division.)
But the reality was that we had attacked with only one brigade!
'Sir, the Pakistanis have come'
So Pakistan's 53 Brigade was ordered to reinforce them.
While they knew we had attacked their formidable defences at Comilla, they did not know the exact position of our three battalions.
We sent a patrol from 12 Kumaon located at Chandina (on the strategic Comilla-Daudkhandi-Dacca axis). The patrol of 12 men was commanded by young Lieutenant Sinha. When night fell, the patrol rested in a field.
Now Pakistan's 53 Brigade (which was moving to reinforce Comilla cantonment) also rested in the same area.
When day broke, our patrol of 12 saw thousands of Pakistani soldiers!
The Pakistanis also saw them and thought there was a huge Indian Army battalion. In truth our patrol was only 12 people.
Our boys opened fire at them -- what an encounter!
12 soldiers faced by a strength of nearly 3,000.
The Pakistanis panicked because they had received the message that a division of the Indian Army had attacked them. They retreated and decided to go cross country.
When they reached the base of the hill, they converged on our Brigade HQ which had about 100 people -- mostly signal and clerical staff.
He was in a small tent. The officer commanding the Signals Regiment came running and said, 'Sir, the Pakistanis have come.' when asked whether he should destroy the top secret documents. He told him not to panic.
He went outside and saw the Pakistanis were 1,000 to 1,500 yards away and sent a Gorkha platoon defending the brigade HQ to go forward and open fire.
The Pakistanis did not come in thinking it was a heavily guarded place, when we had nothing!
They could have totally liquidated us, but we did not panic and held on.
1,600 SOLDIERS WITH TWO COLONELS AND 1,188 RIFLES SURRENDERED!
Pakistan's beleaguered 53 Brigade took a full circle and reached the same place where they had halted for the night.
Here they came face-to-face with Lieutenant Sinha again, who was still holding that position. The Indian platoon fired at them.
The Pakistanis thought they were surrounded whereas we were not more than 20 soldiers at any place -- first engaged by a patrol of 12, then by the administrative element of a battalion, then by a platoon of 20 in a brigade HQ and then again by that first platoon of 12!
Sensing defeat, they raised a white flag and conveyed to Lieutenant Sinha that they wanted to surrender.
Lieutenant Sinha was faced with a situation where he just had 12 men but in front of him were thousands of Pakistani soldiers ready to surrender.
He passed the message to the Brigade HQ. We analysed the situation. The brigade commander Brigadier K P Pande asked me to remove his badge and put a major general's badge. I accompanied him to Lieutenant Sinha's location.
The commanding officer of 31 Baluch came forward. Brigadier Pande told him to pile their weapons and equipment on one side and the men on the other.
1,600 soldiers with two full colonels and 1,188 rifles surrendered!
Nowhere did they have to face more than 30 Indian soldiers, yet they were so panic-stricken and were left with no morale to fight.
This was the first group of prisoners of war that India captured.
'I AM COMMANDING THIS COMPANY AND I AM NOT LEAVING MY POSITION TILL I DIE'
Another attack on the Mynamati hills which merits recognition was when our troops captured a little area in the centre of the hill without realising that the whole feature was held by one Pakistani brigade.
We thought it was held by just a company and early in the morning 7 Rajputana Rifles discovered that they were surrounded by Pakistani soldiers and tanks. They had advanced on foot and our tanks had not moved in.
The commanding officer said he needed air support. I had sent a demand for air support a day earlier, but it did not materialise because the entire air force was busy with Dacca.
7 Rajputana Rifles had suffered 38 battle casualties and the colonel commanding Raj Rif asked our permission to withdraw since no air support was coming.
The brigade commander spoke to the Corps Commander General Sagat Singh telling him that 7 Raj Rif were surrounded by Pakistanis troops and tanks.
The corps commander said 'withdraw'; brigade commander Brigadier Pande said 'withdraw'; Commanding Officer Colonel Brar then ordered Major Shyam Singh Bhatti, the officer in the thick of battle, to 'withdraw' -- he said no!
Major Bhatti said, 'The moment I leave these captured trenches everyone of us will be killed. The tanks are 200 yards ahead of me, but haven't come on me. I am firing at the tanks with my platoon anti-tank weapons, but the moment I leave my trenches everyone of us will be killed. I am not leaving.'
Colonel Brar said, 'I will hold you responsible,' and Major Bhatti replied, 'yes hold me responsible. So long as I am commanding this company I am not leaving this position till I die.'
I was listening to this conversation. Tears came into my eyes.
It turned out that the only man whose decision was correct that day was Major Shyam Singh Bhatti.
( He was father of Col Sangram Singh Bhati, Shaurya Chakra, 10 PARA SF who passed away in 2018. )
In the meantime four IAF aircraft emerged from Dacca.
We got in touch with them on the radio and asked if they could support us. They said they had unloaded all their ammunition in Dacca.
I said, 'Can you just fly low?' Maybe the Pakistani tanks will disappear.' They first declined, but agreed on my persuasion.
They asked us to identify the target and flew low. It was a daring act by these pilots because they were flying without any ammunition.
They came, took one round, dove and the Pakistan attack disappeared!
In the meantime, we moved our tanks and the situation over the Myanamati hills was saved.
Major Bhatti survived, but unfortunately did not get recognised.
'GENERAL SAGAT SINGH WAS THE BEST FIELD LEADER THE INDIAN ARMY HAS PRODUCED'
Another revealing incident of the war was that because we had to move cross-country, we were given two companies of mules to carry our rations and reserved ammunition.
The plan was once we had infiltrated on foot, village tracks would be prepared to make way for the jeeps.
We were harnessing two companies of mules and jeeps -- nearly 300 mules and 300 jeeps! It was chaotic.
We were living in tents when in all this mess, a helicopter arrived.
It was the Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Sagat Singh. He had flown over and seen the chaos.
General Sagat was 6 feet 4 inch tall, well built -- and the best field leader the Indian Army has produced.
I was sure he would pull me up for the chaos, but he didn't say a word. He asked, 'Everything under control?' I said, 'Yes sir.' That was all. 'Where will you be tomorrow?' he asked. Burichang, I said -- and he said he would have breakfast with us.
One learns a lot from such an attitude of a senior officer -- it shows that one must not panic in a disturbed situation and trust men under your command to handle situations.
'JAGGI, OVER MY DEAD BODY'
With no opposition 4 Corps had already achieved the objective of reaching the Meghna river and instead of waiting on the East bank (as per the plan), General Sagat Singh ordered the troops to cross the river and carry on.
We had Mi4 helicopters that could take only 6 people at a time. We created night lamps, artificial helipads to go across the river.
When the Eastern Army Commander in Calcutta Lieutenant General J S Aurora discovered 4 Corps had crossed the Meghna, he asked General Sagat Singh why he had crossed the river when his task was to liberate territory only till the east bank.
I could hear General Sagat Singh's reply because I handed over the radio set to him. He used to call General Aurora 'Jaggi' and he said, "Jaggi, I have given you A+."
He told him he was the commander on the ground and was expected to exploit an opportunity. He took that opportunity and now was on his way to Dacca.
General Aurora asked him to withdraw his troops, but General Sagat Singh refused. 'Jaggi, over my dead body,' he said.
This action by General Sagat Singh created the situation for the Indian Army to plan the capture of Dacca.
The army's plan was to create three enclaves:
1. Up to the east bank of the Meghna.
2. Up to the west bank of the Ganga.
3. Up to the north bank of the Padma.
After creating these enclaves, the Bangladesh government in exile was to be established and that would be the end of the war.
Dacca was not our objective.
Therefore, I say that the creator of Bangladesh was Lieutenant General Sagat Singh. But he did not get his due.
'IF I DIDN'T DIE TODAY I WILL NOT DIE IN THIS WAR'
Then we were told to go to Daudkandi from where ferries use to leave for Dacca.
There was a single road leading up to it which had been dug up by the Pakistanis and laid with mines.
The Mukti Bahini mustered 200 to 300 rickshaws and we moved cross country, village to village by avoiding the roads up to Daudkandi and then moved on to Dacca.
By then, Pakistan had decided to surrender.
I remember another incident where Brigadier Pande and me were standing and a 120 mm bomb landed between us.
The bomb is of such precision that 1 in a million may just not explode. It is lethal and kills everything within 100 yards -- but that bomb did not explode! But its impact was so high that I lost my voice for a while.
We walked away and Brigadier Pande said to me, 'If I didn't die today I will not die in this war.'
He was with his troops everywhere during the attacks when a brigade commander doesn't need to.
It created a psychological impact on him that he was not going to die and he passed it down the chain.
A potent situation in a war is not to panic. Even in reverses a soldier needs to maintain his calm.
From junior level subedars and havaldars to young officers, the Indian Army is replete with many such examples in the face of battle.
What happened to these incredibly brave men after the war:
Lieutenant General Sagat Singh: Known for his innovative battle strategy, the general -- one of India's greatest military leaders -- is a rare army officer to be awarded the Padma Bhushan. He passed away in 2001.
Brigadier Kailash Prasad 'Tom' Pande: Was awarded the Mahavir Chakra for the 1971 War and participated in every battle India had fought up to that year. He lost 95 personnel at Mynamati and 45 at Dhalai.
He was wounded and fought for a week with his leg dangling, he told told UNI nearly 10 years ago. The battle of Dhalai was one of the hardest fought battles in the 1971 War.
He passed away in 2010.
Major Shyam Singh Bhatti: Retired from the Indian Army and lives in Jodhpur.
Lieutenant Sinha: Lives in Dehradun and looks after the Rapahel Home for the disabled.
Lieutenant General O P Kaushik: Fought in the 1962 War with China, the 1965 and 1971 Wars.
As a major general, on deputation to the home ministry, he raised the Black Cat commandos.
He has served on the Siachen Glacier, in Mizoram, Nagaland and Kashmir. His son is a brigadier in the Indian Army.
Conclusion
When operations commenced to liberate Bangladesh, his Corps relentlessly attacked and defeated Pakistan forces, crossed river lines and terrain considered impassable.
Sagat's decision to cross the Meghna proved to be crucial to the entire operation. This was also the first instance in military history of an 'air bridge' being used for crossing a major water obstacle, by a brigade group. In his book, 'Victory in Bangla Desh', Major General Lachhman Singh, who commanded 20 Mountain Division, which was part of 33 Corps during the campaign, writes, "It was here that Sagat Singh exhibited the genius and initiative of a field commander. It was this decision which finally and decisively tilted the scale in our favour and led to the early surrender of the Pakistani forces at Dacca." It was a bold decision, fraught with risk, and if he had failed, the responsibility would have been entirely his. However, battles are not won by those with weak hearts, as military history as proved, time and again. Every military operation is a gamble, and stakes are invariably high. Sagat was one of those who played for the jackpot, and won.
After the war, B.B. Lal, who was the Defence Secretary, told Sagat an interesting story. On 10 December 1971, at 1300 hours, there was a meeting being held in South Block, chaired by Sardar Swaran Singh, the Minister of External Affairs. Attending the meeting were the Defence, Home and Foreign Secretaries, the Director of the IB, and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. The meeting had just commenced when the message arrived that Sagat had crossed the Meghna. The Defence Minister, Babu Jagjiwan Ram, rushed in soon afterwards, while the Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary ran to her office to inform her. According to Lal, very soon afterwards, Indira Gandhi was seen running down the corridor, her hair and saree flying.
They were all surprised, to see the Prime Minister, bubbling with joy, and for him, this was the most unforgettable moment of the 1971 war. This was also the one day that Sam Manekshaw could not take credit for having ordered the operation, quipped Lal.
Sagat's contribution in the liberation of Bangla Desh was recognised by the award of a Padma Bhushan, a non gallantry award which is normally given to civilians. (The three awards in the Padma series are Padma Vibhushan, which ranks just below the Bharat Ratna, the highest in the land; the Padma Bhushan; and the Padma Shri). The majority of awardees are artists, writers, scientists, bureaucrats and politicians. Soldiers are rarely given the award, and that too for contributions in non-military fields. Thimayya was awarded the Padma Bhushan, and Thorat the Padma Shri, for their performance in United Nations assignments in Korea. Sagat's sterling performance in 1971 was in military operations, against the enemy, and a gallantry award would have been more appropriate. Perhaps the military hierarchy did not recommend him for a gallantry award, and as a compromise, the political leadership decided to compensate him by giving him a civilian award, since he had already been awarded the PVSM, just two years earlier.
Lt. Gen Sagat Singh, PVSM innovative use of helicopters has never been repeated.
His is the only example in the Indian Army of a successful corps level campaign, which can stand out historically.
His knowledge of the operational art was perhaps without parallel.
It was ironical that the most successful Corps Commander in the 1971 War had to be content with a civilian award, while several others, whose performance was much below par were decorated for gallantry, and became war heroes.
In November 1973, after commanding 4 Corps for exactly three years, Sagat was transferred, and given command of 1 Corps. He had been serving in the East for more than eight years, and wanted to go to some place nearer home, from where he could look after his family. His request was acceded to, and he was posted to 1 Corps, which was in Mathura. He retired in November 1974, and moved to Jaipur, where he had decided to live after his retirement. He built a farm house, on the out skirts of the city, aptly named 'Meghna Farm', and settled down. Shortly after his retirement, he became a Director of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, as well as several other companies.
Sagat had four sons, two of whom joined the Army. His eldest son, Ran Vijay, was born in February 1949. He was commissioned into 1 Garhwal, which was later mechanised, and redesignated as 6 MECH. The historical association between the Garhwal Rifles and 2/3 Gorkha Rifles lies in the fact that the original 2/3 Gorkha Rifles, raised in 1887, started with a nucleus of Garhwalis, and in 1890 was renamed 39th Garhwali Regiment, the forbears of the present Garhwal Rifles. The Colonel of the Garhwal Rifles claimed Sagat's eldest son, when he was to get his commission, based on this historical association. His second son, Dig Vijay, was born in October 1950, and was commissioned into 2/3 Gorkha Rifles, the battalion his father had commanded. Unfortunately, he died an untimely death while serving with the battalion in Poonch as a Captain on 4 March 1976, when the jeep in which he was travelling met with an accident. His third son Vir Vijay was born in August 1954. A ill-fated scooter accident in Delhi claimed his life just eight months before that of his elder brother. The loss of two sons in the prime of their lives within a short span of eight months was a terrible loss to Sagat and his wife. Their youngest son Chandra Vijay was born in April 1956. He did not join the Army and became a business executive.
In November 1998, Sagat lost his wife and became a widower. He lived alone in Jaipur and his children and grand children visited him whenever they could. About two and a half years after the death of his wife, he was operated on for cancer of the prostate in Delhi. He returned to Jaipur in July 2001 and seemed to have recovered. But he was taking a heavy dose of medicines and these soon had side effects that proved fatal. He was afflicted by Hepatitis A and had to be moved to Delhi. He breathed his last in the Army hospital on 26 September 2001.
Sagat was a soldier, but he was also a human being, and had the foibles of that species, like everyone else. One of these was his proclivity for affaires de coeur. A husky six foot two, he was a handsome man in his prime and women found him not only attractive, but irresistible. There are many stories about his peccadilloes, not all of which are true. Even if they were, they did not ever affect his performance as a combat leader. In any case, he is in honourable company; Caesar, Napoleon, Nelson, and Wellington, all had similar weaknesses. In his book, 'On The Psychology of Military Incompetence', Norman Dixon writes; "he (Wellington) shared with Nelson a predilection for the fairer sex, which could on occasion invite some fairly adverse comments from his contemporaries". The views of Sam Manekshaw, India's most popular military leader, on this subject are well known.
Sagat was a commander, who led from the front. He epitomises the traditional image of the military leader, who fights, and leads, by example. If he had been born a few centuries earlier, or in America or Europe, and had the chance of operating on a larger canvas, he would perhaps have been one of the Great Captains of War. Unfortunately, the Nation did not recognise his talents, or value his contribution, and lesser mortals were given the rewards that he deserved. However, for those who know him intimately, or have had the fortune to serve under him, Sagat Singh was the type of military leader whom soldiers follow willingly, and give their lives for.
His achievements were recognised by Govt of Bangladesh, when President, publicly and formally honoured his son and daughter-in-law in Mar 2013.
Bharat Ratna Must Be Awarded To Late Lt Gen Sagat Singh Says General Cherish Kathaon -
Goc South Western Command of Indian Army suggests, Lt Gen Sagar Singh must be given Bharat Ratna.
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