He was given command of Para Brigade on promotion and led it in Goa Operations with aplomb and responsible for liberating this Portuguese Colony. Though the result of the operations in Goa was along expected lines, the speed of the Indian advance surprised many observers. The credit for this goes to Sagat, and his troops, who exceeded their brief, and managed to reach Panjim, which they had not been asked to do. The fact that 17 Infantry Division, in spite of the vastly superior resources at their disposal, and almost no opposition from the enemy, could make little headway, goes to show that the going was not easy. If the paratroopers succeeded, it was because of better fighting spirit, morale and leadership. The ability to take risks, and seize fleeting opportunities is the hall mark of a successful military leader, and Sagat proved beyond doubt that he had these qualities in ample measure. The failure of Indian troops, barely a year afterwards when facing the Chinese, only underlined the point that irrespective of the fighting capabilities of the soldier, it is the quality of leadership which tilts the balance, in war.
In January 1964, Sagat handed over command of 50 Para Brigade to Brigadier A.M.M. Nambiar, and proceeded to attend the fourth course, at the National Defence College, in Delhi. After spending a year on the course, he was posted as Brigadier General Staff 11 Corps, in January 1965. He served in this appointment for just six months, and in July 1965, was promoted Major General, and posted as GOC 17 Mountain Division, replacing Major General Har Prasad. The division was then in Sikkim, and soon after he took over, there was a crisis. In order to help Pakistan during the 1965 War, the Chinese served an ultimatum, and demanded that the Indians withdraw their posts at Nathu La and Jelep La. According to the Corps HQ, the main defences of 17 Mountain Division were at Changgu, while Nathu La was only an observation post. In the adjoining sector, manned by 27 Mountain Division, Jelep La was also considered an observation post, with the main defences located at Lungthu. In case of hostilities, the divisional commanders had been given the authority to vacate the posts, and fall back on the main defences. Accordingly, orders were issued by Corps HQ to both divisions to vacate Nathu La and Jelep La.
Sagat did not agree with the views of the Corps HQ. Nathu La and Jelep La were passes, on the watershed, which was the natural boundary. The MacMahon Line, which India claimed as the International Border, followed the water shed principle, and India and China had gone to war over this issue, three years earlier. Vacating the passes on the watershed would give the Chinese the tactical advantage of observation and fire, into India, while denying the same to our own troops. Nathu La and Jelep La were also important because they were on the trade routes between India and Tibet, and provided the only means of ingress through the Chumbi Valley. Younghusband had used the same route during his expedition, sixty five years earlier, and handing it over to the enemy on a plate was not Sagat's idea of sound military strategy. Sagat also reasoned that the discretion to vacate the posts lay with the divisional commander, and he was not obliged to do so, based on instructions from Corps HQ.
From probal dasgupta’s Watershed 1967 book, the man in nathu la and cho la sector
As a result of orders issued by Corps HQ, 27 Mountain Division vacated Jelep La, which the Chinese promptly occupied. However, Sagat refused to vacate Nathu La, and when the Chinese became belligerent, and opened fire, he also opened up with guns and mortars, though there was a restriction imposed by Corps on the use of artillery. Lieut-General (later General) G.G. Bewoor, the Corps Commander, was extremely annoyed, and tried to speak to Sagat, to ask him to explain his actions. But Sagat was not in his HQ, and was with the forward troops. So it was his GSO 1, Lieut Colonel Lakhpat Singh, who bore the brunt of the Corps Commander's wrath.
The Chinese had installed loudspeakers at Nathu La, and warned the Indians that they would suffer as they did in 1962, if they did not withdraw. However, Sagat had carried out a detailed appreciation of the situation, and reached the conclusion that the Chinese were bluffing. They made threatening postures, such as advancing in large numbers, but on reaching the border, always stopped, turned about and withdrew. They also did not use any artillery, for covering fire, which they would have certainly done if they were serious about capturing any Indian positions. Our own defences at Nathu La were strong. Sagat had put artillery observation posts on adjoining high features called Camel's Back and Sebu La, which overlooked into the Yatung valley for several kilometres, and could bring down accurate fire on the enemy, an advantage that the Chinese did not have. It would be a tactical blunder to vacate Nathu La, and gift it to the Chinese. Ultimately, Sagat's fortitude saved the day for India, and his stand was vindicated, two years later, when there was a show down at Nathu La. Today, the strategic pass of Nathu La is still held by Indian troops, while Jelep La is in Chinese hands.
During the crisis, the Chinese had occupied Jelep La, but had gained nothing in the sector under Sagat's division. This was galling, and they continued their pressure on the Indians, and making threatening gestures. In December 1965, the Chinese fired on a patrol of 17 Assam Rifles, in North Sikkim, at a height of 16,000 feet, killing two men. The patrol was in Indian territory, but the Chinese claimed that it had crossed over to their side. They made regular broadcasts from loudspeakers at Nathu La, pointing out to Indian troops the pathetic conditions in which they lived, their low salaries and lack of amenities, comparing these to that of officers. It was a form of psychological warfare in which the Chinese were adept, and had to be countered. Sagat had similar loud speakers installed on our own side, and tape recorded messages, in Chinese language, were broadcast every day. However, he was not satisfied with this, and kept looking for a chance to avenge the death of the Indian soldiers who had fallen to Chinese bullets. Throughout 1966, and early 1967, Chinese propaganda, intimidation and attempted incursions into Indian territory continued. The border was not marked, and there were several vantage points on the crest line which both sides thought belonged to them. Patrols which walked along the border often clashed, resulting in tension, and sometimes even casualties.
In 1967, Sagat discussed the problem with the Corps Commander, Lieut General J.S. Aurora. He suggested that the border at Nathu La should be clearly marked, to prevent such incidents, and offered to walk along the crest line, to test the Chinese resolve. If they did not object, the line along which he walked could be taken to be acceptable to them. This was agreed to, and Sagat, accompanied by an escort, began walking along the crest. The Chinese commander also walked alongside, accompanied by a photographer, who kept taking pictures. However, there was no confrontation, and the 'walk' ended peacefully.
Sagat then obtained the concurrence of the Corps Commander to mark the crest line, along which he had walked. He ordered a double wire fence to be erected, from Nathu La towards the North and South Shoulders. However, as soon as work began on the fence, on 20 August 1967, the Chinese became agitated, and asked the Indians to stop. One strand of wire was laid that day, and two more were added over the next two days. On 6 September, a patrol of 2 Grenadiers, the battalion which was holding defences at Nathula, was going towards the South Shoulder, when it was surrounded by about seventy Chinese, and threatened. The next day, the Chinese physically tried to interfere with the construction of the fence, and there was a scuffle. However, work continued on the next two days, and was almost completed on the 10th.
On the night of 10 September 1967,(then Maj Gen) Sagat Singh got little sleep. He would soon know whether or not he had taken the right decision by insisting on the fencing of the border.
Brigadier Bakshi, the brigade commander, was an armoured corps officer who specialized in tank warfare in the plains and didn't possess experience in the Himalayas, where tanks didn't have a role to play. For his role in the 1965 war, he was awarded the Vir Chakra, one of the nation's eminent gallantry awards. Brigadier Bakshi was asked to move up from the brigade headquarters in Chhanggu and occupy the forward post at Nathu La. Brigadier Bakshi left for Nathu La at 5 am on 11 September.
Gen. Sagat had asked for some medium guns, and these were moved up to Kyangnosa La, at a height of over 10,000 ft. The artillery observation post officers at Sebu La and Camel's Back had been put on alert.
Sheru Thapliyal was placed at the artillery observation post at Sebu La, an elevated feature beside Nathu La that overlooked the pass. Sheru was aware of the work on the fence at the border and the ongoing tussle kept him on his toes. Camel's Back had been put on alert. Sheru Thapliyal was placed at the artillery observation post at Sebu La, an elevated feature beside Nathu La that overlooked the pass. Sheru was aware of the work on the fence at the border and the ongoing tussle kept him on his toes. As an artillery observation post officer, his role was to bring down heavy fire and shelling on the enemy.
General Sagat, in his briefing the previous evening, had unequivocally instructed his commanders not to expose themselves to the enemy.
Since the Chinese appeared determined to prevent completion of the fence, it was decided to start early on 11th, and finish the job before first light. All available manpower, including a platoon of Engineers and another of Pioneers, was deployed for the task. A company of 18 Rajput was also brought in, to reinforce the position, and protect the men who were to construct the fence. As soon as work commenced, the Chinese came upto the fence, and tried to stop the work. Work commenced at dawn as planned. The response was an expected one too -- a bunch of Chinese soldiers, eager for the Indians to show up, strode up angrily to the fence.
The PLA men stood in front of the soldiers laying the wire. The Chinese commander was leading the argument and the political commissar stood next to him facing Rai Singh and the others including Bishan and his men. The Indians were asked to stop work immediately. Patience, clearly, was running out faster than expected.
A scuffle erupted and the commissar got roughed up once again. There was a heated discussion between the Chinese commander, who was accompanied by the political commissar, and Lieut Colonel Rai Singh, CO 2 Grenadiers. Sagat had foreseen this eventuality, and told Lieut Colonel Rai Singh not to expose himself, and remain in his bunker, where the Brigade Commander, Brigadier M.M.S. Bakshi, was also present. But this was not heeded, and the CO, with an escort, came out in the open, to stand face to face with the Chinese officers. As the arguments became more heated, tempers rose, but both sides stood their ground.
Then, all of a sudden, the Chinese soldiers disengaged and returned to their bunkers. They acted with chilling, unflappable coordination. On the Chinese side, the morning was going as per plan. The commissar and the party had returned to their bunkers, leaving the Indians uncertain and uneasy. Their machine guns had been put in place, the gunners had been alerted, the soldiers in their bunkers had taken position.
It was around 7.45 am when a loud whistle broke the silence. What followed was the unbroken, grating, terrifying staccato of machine-gun fire. The Chinese let loose a ruthless barrage of shots on the exposed fence-laying Indian party. In the initial barrage a hundred men, caught out in the open, perished or were injured, including a few Chinese who were tardy in getting into their bunkers.
Soon, the area was pounded by shelling. The Chinese opened up with their artillery. It wasn't long before the gunners made their adjustments and the shells began to inch closer to the Indian posts, raining hellfire from the sky. Something needed to be done quickly to salvage the situation.
In the bunkers, Bakshi was aware that the morale of the troops would start to sink if an effective response wasn't mounted soon. As the fighting wore on, behind the ridge appeared a tall silhouette, ramrod straight in posture, a sten machine carbine in hand, at the back end of the battle. To the few that had had enough of the tough battle and who decided to retreat to a safer shelter, a rude surprise awaited.
At one stage, soon after their CO was wounded, there was a loss of morale in 2 Grenadiers, and some troops occupying the South Shoulder started upsticking. Sagat borrowed a sten from another officer, and with the help of the Subedar Major, pushed the men back into the trenches. General Sagat had decided to move closer to the scene of the battle. Like a no-nonsense army drill sergeant out to catch cadets who had loitered outside the precincts without permission, the general had started to marshal the troops that had abandoned the battle, shouting at them, herding them back into action. Sagat stood on the road coming down from Nathu La trying to stem the rout. He even threatened to shoot anyone he found moving to the rear.
General Sagat hated to see his troops run away from the Chinese. When he saw a few men struggling to keep up, he screamed at them, scolding, lambasting those who had gone astray, finally collecting them like a schoolteacher at picnic and steering them back into class--up towards the forward posts, into their harnesses and back into the battle.
Most of the soldiers stayed & fought valiantly, some attaining martyrdom. Sagat, sans permission from the government of India, hadn't been able to use artillery, in response to the Chinese shelling and heavy machine gun fire that had cost him the lives of close to a hundred soldiers. Sagat, in his capacity as a division commander, did not have the authority to use artillery and neither did the corps commander, Jagjit Singh Aurora.
The Army Chief was away, travelling abroad, and Sam Manekshaw, the eastern army commander, who was officiating in his place in Delhi, wasn't immediately available to give the orders. Time was running out at Nathu La. Any more delay would have caused a repeat of 1962. When the higher-ups paid no heed to his insistence, as the commander on ground, Sagat Singh decided to order the artillery fire himself. It is said that when Indira Gandhi, who was attending an important meeting, was finally asked for permission -- though this was moot since Sagat had already ordered the use of artillery himself -- she promptly gave the go-ahead. She took the message and ordered the use of artillery without hesitation.
The artillery officers in the observation posts rose to the occasion.
The artillery observation posts, which Sagat had sited earlier, proved their worth in bringing down effective fire on the Chinese. Because of lack of observation, and the steep incline West of Nathu La, most Chinese shells fell behind the forward defences, and did not harm the Indians. The medium guns boomed, supported by the machine guns and mortars from the forward posts. Sheru called up his cannons to unleash an uninterrupted torrent of bombardment on the Chinese, the shells crashing down on the Chinese bunkers.
By the time the bombardment ended, the casualties on the Chinese side were enormous. Approximately 340 PLA soldiers were dead and over 450 injured -- bodies were strewn outside the bunkers, tossed behind the lines, buried in trenches.
The Chinese gunners had made the mistake of opening up, thus inviting the wrath of the better positioned Indian artillery. The Chinese shelling wasn't effective as the lay of the land ensured that most shells flew beyond the ridge and over the targets that sat in defiladed positions.
But when the Indian artillery opened fire, it had every Chinese target within sight. The decimation of PLA defences, the first ever in a conflict in an India--China battle, was complete. Sagat was a marked man because despite the success, casualties on the Indian side included eighty-eight dead and over 150 injured, which his superiors would not be happy about An aggressive Sagat was not willing to take the setback lying down and he had even ordered Brigadier Bakshi to plan an attack on the Chinese on 13 September (the battle started on 11 September), as the continued artillery shelling had eliminated the Chinese defences. But the permission never came and the attack was shelved on orders from Delhi.
On 14 September, the Chinese government threatened to use its air force if India continued with any more artillery shelling. It was evident that the Indian army had put the Chinese on the back foot and to tacitly accept that they had been soundly beaten in the battle of Nathu La.
The Chinese now needed to up the ante -- and hence the threat of using the air force. The lesson, though, had been driven home: the Chinese had been given a bloody nose. Fighting stopped thereafter at Nathu La. Stunned and alarmed, the Chinese were stewing over the losses and were bracing up for an opportunity to hit back. After all, Nathu La was likely to be an outlier, a spark in the dark.
The Indians got lucky was the reaction of disbelief on the Chinese side. The Indian army that had been defeated over five years ago had made a triumphant return at Nathu La.
The Indian casualties in the action were just over two hundred - 65 dead and 145 wounded. The Chinese are estimated to have suffered about three hundred casualties. Though the action taken by Sagat, in marking the border with a wire fence, had the approval of higher authorities, the large number of casualties suffered by both sides created a furore. Of course, the casualties to Indian troops would not have occurred if they had remained in their defences, and not exposed themselves by coming out of their trenches and rushing at the Chinese post. This happened on the spur of the moment, because seeing their CO fall, the troops lost their cool, and rushed forward under the orders of a young officer, who lost his life in the action. The Corps Commander, Lieut General J.S. Aurora, visited Nathu La, to assess the situation. Sagat was advised to prevent further escalation of hostilities, and avoid casualties to Indian troops.
The Chinese had already announced that it was the Indians who started the conflict, and the large number of Indian bodies, and wounded Indian soldiers, in their possession, seemed to support their claim. However, Sagat was not perturbed. For the last two years, the Chinese had been instigating him, and had killed several Indian soldiers. The specter of Chinese attack, of 1962, still haunted the military and political leadership in India and had prevented them from taking effective action against them. This was the first time the Chinese got a bloody nose, and the myth of their invincibility was broken.
Cho La in erstwhile kingdom of sikkim - Oct 1: 🇨🇳troops infiltrated into Sikkim-side of the border, claimed the pass, questioned the Indian occupation of it & started firing. Fighting lasted 1 day & Chinese withdrew 3kms.
October 1, 1967
On October 1, a Chinese platoon deliberately got into an argument with a forward platoon commander Naib Subedar Gyan Bahadur Limbu and bayoneted him at Cho La. But the Chinese forgot that they were facing the Gorkhas, unarguably the most daring warriors in the world. So Limbu’s men retaliated and chopped off the arms of the Chinese soldiers who killed their commander. That quickly escalated into a fierce gunbattle which continued for the next 10 days.
Two soldiers, Rifleman Devi Prasad Limbu and Havildar Tinjong Lama, were honoured with the Vir Chakra.
Rifleman Debi Prasad Limbu was the forward sentry in a platoon post in the Cho La area on the 1 October 1967. After he had finished his ammunition, he took out his khukri and charged the Chinese and eliminated five before he gave Supreme sacrifice to the nation.
‘Prashasta Ranvirta’ (Valour in Battle is Praiseworthy). 1 Oct 1967. ‘Cho La’. Lieutenant Colonel Mahatam Singh while commanding 10 JAK RIF displayed exemplary courage, leadership & devotion to duty in highest traditions of IndianArmy. Awarded MahaVir Chakra.
India lost some brave soldiers but were able to drive back the Chinese three kilometers behind the Cho La pass. The total number of Indian casualties in both Nathu La and Cho La incidents stand at 88 while 163 were wounded. China lost around 400 soldiers and was left with 450 wounded.
ChoLaDay
Rich tributes to 21Bravehearts,
IA soldiers who laid down their lives on icy heights of Cho La in Sikkim from 01 to 04 Oct 1967, kept Tricolour Flying. Trishakti Corps in reverberations of rememberance.
NATHU LA (1967)
Background
Nathu La lies on the Old Silk Routebetween Tibet and India. In 1904 Major Francis Younghusband, serving as the British Commissioner to Tibet, led a successful mission through Nathu La to capture Lhasa. This led to the setting up of trading posts at Gyantse andGartok in Tibet, and gave control of the surrounding Chumbi Valley to the British. The following year, China and Great Britain ratified an agreement approving trade between Sikkimand Tibet. In 1947, Sikkim became an Indian protectorate. After China took control of Tibet in 1950 and suppressed a Tibetan uprising in 1959, refugees entered Sikkim through Nathu La.During the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Nathu La witnessed skirmishes between soldiers of the two countries. Shortly thereafter, the pass was sealed and was closed for trade. Five years later, Nathu La was the scene of a ‘border skirmish’ between Indian and China, which resulted in heavy casualties to both sides. Significantly, it was the first and only instance when the Chinese got a ‘bloody nose’ from the Indians. After its success in 1962 War, China was overconfident & thought That it could easily run over Indian Army defenses and capture strategically important features Nathu La pass. Not only China wanted to occupy the dominant features, it also wanted to annex Sikkim which till then was only a Protectorate & not a full fledged state of India.
Chinese expected Indian govt to help it occupy Sikkim like Nehru had done in 1950, when he had tacitly helped China to capture Tibet.
But in 1967, Sikkim was responsibility of India as its protectorate.
In order to help Pakistan during the 1965 War, the Chinese served an ultimatum and demanded that India withdraw her posts at Nathu La and Jelep La. According to HQ XXXIII Corps, the main defences of 17 Mountain Division were at Changgu, while Nathu La was only an observation post. In the adjoining sector, manned by 27 Mountain Division, Jelep La was also considered an observation post, with the main defences located at Lungthu. In case of hostilities, the divisional commanders had been given the authority to vacate the posts, and fall back on the main defences. Accordingly, orders were issued by corps headquarters to both divisions to vacate Nathu La and Jelep La. As a result, 27 Mountain Division vacated Jelep La, which the Chinese promptly occupied. However, Major General Sagat Singh, GOC 17 Mountain Division, refused to vacate Nathu La. He reasoned that Nathu La and Jelep La were passes on the watershed, which was the natural boundary. The McMahon Line, which India claimed as the International Border, followed the watershed principle, and India and China had gone to war over this issue, three years earlier. Vacating the passes on the watershed would give the Chinese the tactical advantage of observation and fire, into India, while denying the same to our own troops. He also felt that the discretion to vacate the posts lay with the divisional commander, and he was not obliged to do so, based on instructions from higher headquarters.
The Chinese had installed loudspeakers at Nathu La, and warned the Indians that they would suffer as they did in 1962, if they did not withdraw. However, Sagat had carried out a detailed appreciation of the situation, and reached the conclusion that the Chinese were bluffing. They made threatening postures, such as advancing in large numbers, but on reaching the border, always stopped, turned about and withdrew. They also did not use any artillery, for covering fire, which they would have certainly done if they were serious about capturing any Indian positions. Indian artillery observation posts on adjoining high features called Camel's Back and Sebu La overlooked the Yatung valley for several kilometres, and could bring down accurate fire on the enemy, an advantage that the Chinese did not have. It would have been a tactical blunder to vacate Nathu La and gift it to the enemy. Ultimately, Sagat's fortitude saved the day for India, and his stand was vindicated two years later, when there was a show down at Nathu La.
Vexed by their failure to occupy Nathu La in 1965, the Chinese continued their pressure on the Indians. In December 1965, the Chinese fired on a patrol of 17 Assam Rifles, in North Sikkim, at a height of 16,000 feet, killing two men. They made regular broadcasts from loudspeakers at Nathu La, pointing out to Indian troops the pathetic conditions in which they lived, their low salaries and lack of amenities, comparing these to those enjoyed by Indian officers. It was a form of psychological warfare in which the Chinese were adept, and had to be countered. Sagat had similar loud speakers installed on our own side and tape recorded messages, in Chinese language, were broadcast every day. Throughout 1966 and early 1967, Chinese propaganda, intimidation and attempted incursions into Indian territory continued. The border was not marked, and there were several vantage points on the crest line which both sides thought belonged to them. Patrols which walked along the border often clashed, resulting in tension, and sometimes even casualties.
In the first week of August 1967, the border out posts (BOPs) at Nathu La were occupied by 2 Grenadiers, relieving 18 Rajput. Lieutenant Colonel Rai Singh was then commanding 2 Grenadiers. Major Bishan Singh took over as ‘Tiger Nathu La’, as the company commander holding the pass was generally known, with Captain P.S Dagar as his second-in-command. The deployment at Nathu La comprised a platoon each on Camels Back, South Shoulder, Centre Bump and Sebu La. The battalion headquarters was at Gole Ghar, while the battalion 3-inch mortars were just above Sherabthang, which also had the administrative base and forward aid post. 18 Rajput took over the BOP at Yakla where they had a platoon plus. The BOP’s at Cho La were occupied by a company of 10 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles.
Even while 2 Grenadiers was in the process of taking over the defences at Nathu La, Chinese activities increased. They were noticed repairing their bunkers on North Shoulder and making preparations to construct new ones. On 13 August the observation post at Sebu La reported that the Chinese had arrived on the crest line and dug trenches on our side of the international border. When challenged, they filled up the trenches and withdrew. On the same day they added eight more loud speakers to their already existing 21 speakers on South Shoulder. Due to this the volume of their propaganda increased and could now be heard at Changgu. On the Indian side 30 watt transistorized amplifiers with six speakers had been installed on South Shoulder by 112 Mountain Brigade Signal Company. Propaganda was relayed through tape recorders from Hotel.
The divisional commander discussed the problem with the corps commander, Lieutenant General J.S. Aurora, and obtained his concurrence to mark the crest line. 2 Grenadiers was ordered to lay a three-strand wire fence along the border from Nathu La towards the North Shoulder. However, as soon as work began on the fence on 20 August 1967, the Chinese became agitated, and asked the Indians to stop. One strand of wire was laid that day, and two more were added over the next two days. This led to an escalation in Chinese activity. On 23 August at about 1400 hours Major Bishan Singh reported that about 75 Chinese in battle dress carrying rifles fitted with bayonets were advancing towards Nathu La. They advanced slowly in an extended line and had stopped on reaching the border extending from Four Poles area to Mao Tse Tung’s photograph on South Shoulder. At 1430 hours they started shouting slogans which the Political Commissar read out from a red book and the rest repeated after him. Indian troops were ‘standing to’, watching and waiting. Nothing happened for another hour. After standing on the border for about an hour the Chinese withdrew and all was calm and quiet again.
On 1 September the corps commander along with the divisional commander visited Nathu La. The visibility that day was rather poor. They went to Centre Bump first and then to South Shoulder. Then they walked along the border to Four Poles area, where they crossed the border and went a few steps inside. At once, the Chinese Political Commissar came running up to them, shouting “Chini, Chini”, indicating that they have crossed the border into China. The two generals immediately withdrew, but the Chinese kept on grumbling. Soon a photographer came and took photographs of their footsteps across the border.
Next morning Sagat again went to Nathu La. He directed that the border from Right OP to Camels Back must be patrolled. Immediately a patrol of two officers, one JCO and 15 OR was sent out under Major Bishan Singh. As soon as the patrol reached the U Bump near Tekri, the Chinese surrounded them. Major Bishan Singh tried to explain to the Chinese officer that they had not crossed the border and in fact it was the Chinese who were in Indian territory. However, the Chinese did not budge. Bishan and his men then pushed their way through the Chinese and returned to Hotel. The CO, Lieutenant Colonel Rai Singh, was watching all this from South Shoulder.
On 4 September Sagat again went to Nathu La. He directed that the wire fence be converted into a Cat Wire Type 1 obstacle, using concertina coils. The task was assigned to 2 Grenadiers. A platoon of 70 Field Company Engineers under Major Cheema was allotted to assist them. On 5 September work started at 0500 hours but the Chinese objected. There was an argument between Colonel Rai Singh and the Chinese Political Commissar as to alignment of the border. The work was stopped at 0800 hours. However, work on Chinese defences on North and South Shoulder continued. During the night the Chinese came up to the Bump and cut off one shoulder so that if water was poured on the other shoulder it would flow into China. Next morning when our men went to straighten out some wire a few Chinese came running up to the border with a bucket of water and poured it on the Bump indicating the watershed.
On 7 September the work started again on the laying the wire. This time about a hundred Chinese came to the fence and there was hand to hand fighting between the troops. Realising that they were unequal to the Jats, the Chinese withdrew and began pelting stones, the Grenadiers responding in the same manner. Because of all this fighting there was not much progress in the laying of the wire. The Chinese suffered a few casualties in wounded and we had two wounded. On 8 and 9 September things were relatively quiet but the Chinese continued work on their defences.
By now Sagat’s patience had been exhausted and he was determined to complete the work before he proceeded on leave on 12 September. On the night of 10 September he held a conference at HQ 112 Mountain Brigade in Changgu, where he personally briefed everyone on how the operation for laying the wire was to be carried out on 11 September. Additional resources in men and material were moved for this purpose. One company of 18 Rajput was brought in to reinforce the defences. An ad hoc force of 90 men was organised into a protection party to charge the Chinese positions if they opened fire. Major Bishan Singh was in charge of the work with Captain P.S Dagar as his assistant. Apart from the platoon of 70 Field Company, a pioneer platoon was to assist in the construction of the fence.
The Events of 11 September 1967
11th Sep 1967- Indian Army decided to lay Barbed wire fencing along Sikkim-Tibet Border on a pre-decided agreement between China and Sikkim.
At 0540 hours(5.40am) on 11 Sep, Engineers and jawans of Indian Army commenced the construction of fencing.
As soon as work commenced on 11 September, the Chinese came up to the fence, and tried to stop it. There was a heated discussion between the Chinese commander, who was accompanied by the Political Commissar and CO 2 Grenadiers. Sagat had foreseen this eventuality and told Rai Singh not to expose himself but remain in his bunker, where the brigade commander, Brigadier M.M.S. Bakshi, was also present. But this was not heeded and Rai Singh, with an escort, came out in the open to stand face to face with the Chinese officers. As the arguments became more heated, tempers rose, with both sides standing their ground. Suddenly, the Chinese opened fire, causing several casualties among the troops working on the wire fence. Colonel Rai Singh was hit by a Chinese bullet, and fell down.
Seeing their CO fall, the Grenadiers became mad with rage. In a fit of fury, they came out of their trenches, and attacked the Chinese post, led by Captain P.S. Dagar. The company of 18 Rajput, under Major Harbhajan Singh, and the sappers and pioneers working on the fence had been caught in the open, and suffered heavy casualties from the Chinese firing. Realising that the only way to neutralise the Chinese fire was a physical assault, Harbhajan shouted to his men, and led them in a charge on the Chinese position. Several of the Indian troops were mowed down by Chinese machine guns, but those who reached the Chinese bunkers used their bayonets and accounted for many of the enemy. Both Harbhajan and Dagar lost their lives in the action, which developed into a full scale battle, lasting six days. Sagat had asked for some medium guns, and these were moved up to Kyangnosa La, at a height of over 10,000 ft. The artillery observation posts proved their worth in bringing down effective fire on the Chinese. Because of lack of observation, and the steep incline west of Nathu La, most Chinese shells fell behind the forward defences, and did not harm the Indians.
Under fire, a quick decision to use artillery had to be made, but the decision from top authorities was getting delayed.
Major Gen Sagat Singh was the Division Cdr of 17 Inf Division in-charge of Sikkim.
It was then that Gen Sagat Singh overstepped his authority & gave the orders to use heavy artillery against Chinese.
This decision by Gen Sagat Singh to use heavy artillery w/o waiting for permission from top authorities changed the course of battle.
Friends, I slightly deviating from 1967 to 1965, when Maj General Sagat Singh was commanding 17 Mountain division, refused to vacate NathuLa as ordered by his superiors. Had he obeyed his superiors, Nathu La pass would have been occupied by Chinese in 1965 itself as China had promptly occupied Jeep La pass vacated by 27th Mtn Div(On orders from top).
During the first day’s action, there was a loss of morale in 2 Grenadiers, when troops occupying the South Shoulder vacated their positions. This became evident after breakdown of communications with South Shoulder. The position was re-occupied and the troops pushed back into their trenches. Signals played an important role in this operation, which has been described subsequently.
The Indian casualties in the action were just over two hundred - 65 dead and 145 wounded. The Chinese are estimated to have suffered about three hundred casualties. Though the action taken by Sagat, in marking the border with a wire fence, had the approval of higher authorities, the large number of casualties suffered by both sides created a furore. The Chinese had already announced that it was the Indians who started the conflict, and the large number of Indian bodies and wounded Indian soldiers in their possession, seemed to support their claim. However, Sagat was not perturbed. For the last two years, the Chinese had been instigating him, and had killed several Indian soldiers. The spectre of the Chinese attack of 1962 still haunted the military and political leadership in India and had prevented them from taking effective action against them. This was the first time the Chinese got a bloody nose, and the myth of their invincibility was broken.
GOC arrived at Sherabthang with C Arty to discuss the operation for the morning of 13 September 67. The plan in general was as follows.
Before first light we would provoke the enemy to open fire. Once he opens fire we would destroy his bunkers with RCL, rocket launchers & strim grenades. Then on a signal of white smoke, troops on South Shoulder would withdraw & take cover just before S Shoulder. Then CO 182 Light would bring down the full divisional artillery and mortars on South & North Shoulders till every soul & bunker is destroyed. Once this is achieved on a signal of red smoke our troops would move from below South Shoulder & capture enemy position on South Shoulder & prevent any enemy counter attack. The plan sounded really ambitious and Commander was rightly rather reluctant to execute it with the amount of briefing of local commanders and degree of preparedness on our own side. The GOC agreed to Commander’s suggestion to have a rehearsal on 13 morning & execute the same on 14 morning. For in that time he will also be able to get an OK from Delhi. After briefing, GOC left for Changgu at 2400 hrs.25
The skirmish at Nathu La continued for another five days. As would be evident from the personal account and diary of Second Lieutenant N.C Gupta, the events left a deep impression on his mind. In his own company, he found instances of fear and cowardice. More than that, he found it difficult to get over the fact that two of the elite infantry battalions of the Indian Army had been found wanting in courage.
Gupta’s actions in holding South Shoulder alone for a few hours, taking Attar Singh and his platoon to reoccupy the feature and saving the life of the badly wounded Major Bishan Singh under enemy fire were indeed commendable and deserved to be rewarded. His actions had been witnessed by the brigade and divisional commanders and it was expected that he would be given a gallantry award. Unfortunately, the fact that South Shoulder post had been abandoned was mentioned in his citation. As was to be expected, the military hierarchy as well as the political leadership was reluctant to highlight this aspect. This was the first brush with the Chinese after 1962 and such a statement was politically not acceptable. On account of its likely repercussions the citation was diluted and the portion about Indian troops vacating their posts was removed. In the event, N.C. Gupta was awarded a Sena Medal instead of the MVC that he deserved.
An interesting sidelight of the Nathu La incident has been given by Lieutenant General M.S. Sodhi, who writes:-
I recall the Nathu La incident too. I was commanding XXXIII Corps Signals. The telephone lines were down and the GOC wanted immediate confirmation of action proposed by him. He dictated his very clear cut and precise appreciation of the situation on the telephone to me and had me send a message to the GOC-in-C with copy to Army HQ !! General JS Aurora considered dictation to me more expedient than sending for his BGS/GSO 1. The message was encrypted and cleared on RTT in a Flash. He got concurrence to his proposed action in very good time.
I also recall a conversation with General Sagat when I happened to meet him at the airport a few days later. I asked him how the communications support was during the operations. His response was, with tongue in cheek, "Bloody awful! The Corps Commander could contact me in the most forward post!"
Let's come back to 1967 Combat at Nathu La. A fierce battle took place between Chinese and Indian troops. Commanding officer of 2nd Grendiers Lt Col Rai Singh Yadav inspite of getting seriously injured fought bravely leading his troops from the front.
Major Harbhajan Singh of 18 Rajput Regiment got seriously wounded, left his trench to destroy enemy's Machine gun with hand grenadewhich was continously firing at Ind troops, killed 6 Chinese soldiers including their Commissar in hand to hand combat with bayonets.
Battle for NathuLa Pass lasted from 11th Sep to 14th Sep 1967.
Ind Army inflicted a telling/embarrassing defeat on PLA of China.
Casualties Details:
India-88 martyred,163wounded
China- 340 killed, 453 wounded
China suffered 75% more casualties than India.
Gallantry Awards- Battle Of NathuLa
MahavirChakra
Tiger Of NathuLa -
Major Harbhajan Singh,18 Rajput Regiment was awarded Mahavir Chakra (posthumously).
Brigadier Rai Singh Yadav, 2nd Grenadiers Commanding officer in 1967
Lt Col Mahatam Singh,10JnK Rifles
VirChakra
Capt PS Dagar
Hav Lakhmi Chand
Sep Gokul Singh
Gen Sagat Singh, the main Architect of victory was not considered for awards. That's the shameful way our Bureaucracy and Political Class works.
Gen Sagat Singh was shunted out to Mizoram to take charge of counter-insurgency operations. He excelled there too Resounding Victory Over China but Indians don't even know. China was taught a lesson which kept it away from Ind borders for next 53 yrs.
India never lost a battle to China after 1962 debacle
1962 - Indian Army did not lose the War to China, but the Bureaucracy and Political Powers at New Delhi let down India, its citizens & Defence Forces.
Indian Defence Forces have never let down the Nation, or the people of India.
They have always stood their ground firmly, fought bravely and earned laurels for the Nation in every battle.
Why the Victory of NathuLa and. Cho La not been told to Indians? Reasons follow
Why the twin victories against Dragon the battles of Sikkim Passes (NathuLa & ChoLa,1967) and the vindication during Somdurong Chu Valley Stand Off hardly ever mentioned, let alone celebrated? Reasons :
Excuse 1-
1967 got sandwiched between the victories of 1965 & 1971
Excuse2 -
Media,Politicians, Bureaucracy may say NathuLa & ChoLa were not full blown Wars.
Excuse 3-
Indian Forces just stood ground successfully calling Chinese bluff. Neither side lost/gained any territory.
Main Reason- Both Victories were won by disobeyng Govt Orders.
Conclusion -
My Dear Patriots, Had it not been for Gen Sagat Singh's refusal to obey orders of Superiors to vacate Nathu La, India would ceded large chunk of land to China, may be even Sikkim.
Sometime, in National interest it's important to disobey superiors.
