Remembering brave Lt. Gen Sagat Singh, PVSM on his birth anniversary. He was a three-star General in the Indian Army notable for his participation in invasion of Goa and later in Bangladesh.
Lt. General Sagat Singh is one of India's most brilliant and audacious military leaders. Though not as well known as some of his contemporaries, his record as a combat leader is unmatched. He not only succeeded in every operation, but went beyond, and achieved more than what he was asked to do. Imbued with an aggressive spirit, and the ability to take risks, he is the epitome of the combat leader, who leads from the front. A brilliant tactician and strategist, he was known for his unconventional and creative manoeuvres, which are the key to success in battle.
Tales about his wartime exploits abound, and are studied by students in military training institutions. Though he did not reach the top of the military ladder, he is better known than many who did. He was the most successful Corps Commander during the 1971 Indo-Pak War, but surprisingly, he was given neither a decoration, nor a promotion. He was a difficult subordinate, and his penchant for the unconventional, and scant regard for rules and regulations, acted as obstacles in his career.
Viewed purely from the military angle, Sagat's performance as a combat leader was par excellence. His standing among Indian military leaders is the same as that of Patton in the US Army, and of Rommel in the Wehrmacht.
Born on 14 July 1919, in Bikaner. His father, Thakur Brij Pal Singh, was a Rathore Rajput, from the vassalage of Bikaner, which was one of the important Indian states ruled by the Rathores, the other being Marwar (Jodhpur). He was serving in the famous Camel Corps of Bikaner, and fought in World War I, in Mesopotamia, now called Iraq.
Sagat was the eldest of three brothers, and had his early education in Walter Nobles' School, in Bikaner. After school, he joined Dungar College, in Bikaner. However, he did not finish his graduation, and after passing the Intermediate examination, He commenced his military career in the Bikaner State Forces.
During World War II, Sagat Singh was commissioned as officer and served in the Middle East. He is indeed a role model for the soldier in all of us. He is unarguably the only military genius post independence India has produced. He commenced his military career through humble beginning in Bikaner State Forces with only a smattering knowledge of English.
Soon after World war II started, Sagat joined the IMA, as an Indian State Forces Cadet. After passing out in 1941, he went back to the Bikaner State Forces, after a short attachment with a British battalion, the South West Borders, which was then at Bannu, in the North West Frontier Province. He joined the Bikaner State Forces at Secunderabad, from where it moved to Chaman, on the Frontier, and later to Faizabad, in the United Provinces. Finally, in October 1941, the unit was ordered to move to Iraq, to suppress the Rashid Ali revolt. After a few months in Iraq, the unit was moved to Kut-el-Amara, and then to Syria, and Palestine, before returning to Iraq, as part of 6 Indian Division. In 1943, he was nominated to attend the junior staff course at the Staff College, at Haifa.
When Sagat reported to the Staff College, he found that the waiters serving in the mess were all Italians, and did not understand English. Sagat asked the British Major, an old re-employed officer who was in charge of the mess, to pass instructions that he should not be served beef. The Major called the Staff Sergeant, and began to pass the orders. The Sergeant nodded his head, and told Sagat not to worry, since the waiters knew about the eating habits of Indians, as they had one on the previous course. When Sagat was served his first meal, he thought the meat did not look like mutton. When he asked a colleague, he was informed that it was indeed beef. After a great deal of expostulation, it was discovered that the 'Indian' on the previous course was the son of Sir Sikander Hayat Khan. The waiters had been told that he did not pork, and they had assumed that Sagat, being an Indian, would have the same preferences. To be on the safe side, Sagat decided to stay away from meat altogether, and remained a vegetarian for the rest of his stay at Haifa.
The course at Haifa, though of seven months duration, was called the junior staff course, and not equated to the full staff course, at Camberley or Quetta. In 1945, he was nominated on the staff course, at Quetta, and thus had the chance to attend two staff courses, within three years. After the course, Sagat returned to Bikaner, to join his unit. However, after the merger of the Indian States with the Indian Union in 1947, he decided to opt for the Indian Army. His application was accepted, and on 15 January 1949, he was granted a permanent commission in the Indian Army. His service in the Bikaner State Forces was counted, and he was given the seniority from 27 October 1941, and assigned to the 3rd Gorkha Rifles. Since he was one of the few officers in the Indian Army who had done the staff course, he was posted to HQ Delhi Area, as GSO 2 (Ops). The GOC was Major General Tara Singh Bal, and the tactical HQ was in the Red Fort.
After a short tenure at Delhi, Sagat was posted as Brigade Major to 168 Infantry Brigade, which was then in Chhamb. From this appointment, he was reverted to regimental service in 1954, and posted as second-in-command, 3/3 Gorkha Rifles, then being commanded by Lieut-Colonel P.S. Thapa. The battalion was located at Bharatpur, in Rajasthan, which was Sagat's home state. In November 1954, it moved to Dharamsala, as part of a brigade which was under the command of Brigadier (later Lieut General) P.O. Dunn, who was from the same regiment, and had commanded 1/3 Gorkha Rifles earlier.
Picture of Sagat Singh when he was Commanding Officer of 3/3 Gurkha Rifle.
In February 1955, Sagat was promoted Lieut Colonel, and given command of 2/3 Gorkha Rifles, which was then at Ferozepore, in the Punjab. He relieved Lieut Colonel Nand Lal Kapur, who had come to the regiment from the Rajputana Rifles. Before Independence, Gorkha regiments were officered only by the British, and no Indians had been permitted. In fact, there was a general feeling among British officers that Gorkha troops would refuse to serve under Indian officers. After Independence, four of the ten Gorkha regiments were transferred to the British Army, while the rest remained in India. However, all Gorkha soldiers were given the choice, to serve in the British or the Indian Army. It came as a surprise to the British that 90 per cent opted to serve in India, under Indian officers. The 2nd, 6th, 7th and 10th Gurkhas became part of ' The Brigade of British Gurkhas'. The 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th and 9th Gurkhas remained in the Indian Army, and were renamed the 'Gorkhas', which was their correct ethnic name. Officers from other regiments of the Indian Army were posted to replace the British officers, who left for home. The majority came from the regiments which had been transferred to Pakistan, such as the Frontier Force and the Baluch Regiment.
2/3 Gorkha Rifles was then part of 167 Infantry Brigade, which was being commanded by Brigadier Badshah. In October 1955, the battalion moved to Jammu, and soon thereafter, Sagat was nominated on the Senior Officers Course, at the Infantry School, Mhow. In December 1955 he handed over command to Lieut Colonel J.P. D'Cunha, who came from his erstwhile battalion, 3/3 Gorkha Rifles. After completing the Senior Officers Course, on which he was an awarded an instructors' grading, Sagat was posted as CO 3/3 Gorkha Rifles, in which he had served as the second-in-command. The CO of 3/3 GR had been removed in February 1956, and the second-in-command, Major P.J. Heffernon was officiating, till Sagat assumed command in April 1956. It was still located at Dharamsala, and Sagat set about improving the standard of training and morale, in right earnest. As a result, the battalion performed exceedingly well, and won the divisional competitions in football, boxing, and skill-at-arms. During an exercise, while performing the role of Advance Guard, it moved at such a blistering pace that the Corps Commander, Lieut General (later General) J.N. Chaudhury, commented, " The rate of advance by the Advance Guard was so rapid that it could not be accepted as normal for planning purposes."
An interesting incident which occurred during Sagat's command was the 'khud race' (khud, loosely translated, means a valley, or steep incline; a khud race is a cross country race, across hills and valleys). 3 Sikh was located nearby, and there was great rivalry between the two battalions, in games and sports. One day, the CO of the Sikhs remarked that his boys could out pace the Gorkhas, anytime, and challenged them to a 'khud race'. He had probably said it a a joke, but Sagat took up the challenge seriously. On the day of the race, he invited the Corps Commander, in addition to the Divisional and Brigade Commanders. Also present was Justice G.D. Khosla, of the Punjab High Court. The Gorkhas won the race, and the Corps Commander said, "Well, there is no doubt as to who is superior up and down the hills." As for Justice Khosla, it was an unique experience, and he remarked, "It is the most thrilling sport I have ever seen. To see a Gorkha coming down the hill is a pleasure indeed."
The battalion moved to an operational area in the Poonch Sector, in Jammu and Kashmir, in August 1957. In November 1957, Sagat handed over command of 3/3 Gorkha Rifles to Lieut Colonel P. Raghavan, and proceeded to the Infantry School, where he had been posted as a Senior Instructor. After spending about a year as Senior Instructor, Sagat was appointed GSO 1, in the Training Team. He was now responsible for preparation of the training material, used for instruction. This involved revision of outdoor as well as indoor exercises, and updating the syllabus, to incorporate new concepts and tactical doctrine. In 1959, he was promoted Colonel, and posted to Delhi, as Deputy Director, Personnel Services, in the Adjutant General's Branch, at Army HQ. He now had to deal with a large number of subjects, such as pay, pension, ceremonials, welfare , terms and conditions of service, etc. He replaced Colonel (later Major General) D.K. 'Monty' Palit, who was promoted, and given command of a brigade.
After a short stint in Delhi, Sagat was promoted Brigadier, and given command of 50 Parachute Brigade, at Agra, in September 1961. This was unprecedented, since he was not a paratrooper, and would have to earn his 'wings', before he could become one. He was then over 40 years old, and few people had started jumping at that age. But Sagat knew that he had to get the coveted 'wings,' before he was accepted in the fraternity of paratroopers, and could wield any authority. He had to undergo the tough probation course, before he could begin his jumps. To save time, he sometimes did two jumps a day, and got his 'wings' in record time. For a person of his age, it was no mean achievement. Para troopers place a high premium on courage and physical toughness, and this improved his stock in the brigade as nothing else could have done. At that time, 50 Parachute Brigade had only two battalions, 1 Para and 2 Para, with the latter having recently joined the formation from Jammu and Kashmir. To get to know his command, and gauge the state of training, Sagat set tactical exercises for both battalion groups. This turned out to be fortuitous, since 2 Para was subsequently given an operational task of a similar kind, except for the riverine obstacles, in Goa.
It was while commanding 50 Parachute Brigade that Sagat really flowered, and his genius as a combat leader came to the fore. During the Goa operations, he displayed tactical brilliance, and the ability to seize opportunities in battle, which few commanders are gifted with. Sagat proved the adage that in war, the timorous rarely succeed, while the bold invariably triumph, even against heavy odds. The story of his exploits during the operations is now part of the Indian Army's folk lore, and is often quoted as an example to students of military science.
The Portuguese enclaves of Goa, Damanand Diu were the last vestiges of colonial rule on the Indian sub-continent. After India achieved independence from British rule in 1947, nationalist movements gained momentum in these enclaves. However, despite international pressure, Portugal refused to vacate her possessions in India, putting down pro-independence movements with an iron hand. After diplomatic efforts to integrate them into the Indian Union failed, military action had to be undertaken. Goa, the largest of the enclaves, was liberated on 19 December 1961 by a force comprising one infantry division, in an operation lasting less than two days. There was almost no opposition and casualties were negligible. The much smaller enclaves of Damanand Diu were tackled by a battalion each at the same time, both falling on 19 December. However, unlike Goa, the defenders of Damanand Diu did not give up without a fight and casualties were suffered on both sides. The Navy and Air Force played a significant role in the liberation of the three enclaves. The conduct of the operations in Goa has been covered in detail, from the inception stage right up to their culmination. Daman and Diu have been mentioned only briefly, since there was no involvement of Signals.
Background
Beautiful Goa .....Do you know when it was a Portuguese colony .. rules by christian church .... 300+ temples were destroyed ....and majority of Hindus were forcefully converted, Goan's and Hindus refuse to accept the genocide by Portuguese. Why are we so forgiving and forgetful??
Goa Inquisition is the cruel thing that can happen in the name of religion.
Goa Inquisition is the cruel thing that can happen in the name of religion.
Before discussing the operations, a brief history of Goa would be in order. Of the three Portuguese enclaves in India, Goa was the largest, with an area of 3,635 square kilometres, and a population of approximately six hundred thousand, of whom more than half were Hindus. The other two enclaves were Daman and Diu, located more than five hundred kilometers to the North of Goa. Daman, including the parganas ( a pargana is a sub division of a district) of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, had an area of 213 square kilometres, and a population of about sixty thousand. Diu was even smaller, measuring just 39 square kilometres, and a population of about twenty thousand.
Though Vasco da Gama discovered the sea route to India in 1498, it was only in the early sixteenth century that the Portuguese began establishing their colonies on the West Coast. The credit for consolidation of Portuguese presence in India goes to Alfonso de Albuquerque, who became the Portuguese Governor in India in 1509.
He maintained cordial relations with local rulers and began to recruit locals in his army, a practice that was copied by Clive and Dupleix for the British and French a century later. By the end of the sixteenth century Portugal had possessions at Goa, Daman, Diu, Salsette, Bassein, Chaul and Bombay on the West Coast; San Thome near Madras and Hooghly in Bengal. In course of time, she lost most of them through wars or treaties, including Bombay, which was ceded to Britain as part of the dowry of Princess Catherine of Braganza, when she married King Charles II of England in 1661. When British rule in India came to an end in 1947, the only foreign colonies that remained were the Portuguese colonies of Goa, Daman and Diu; and the French colony of Pondicherry.
Revolts and agitations against Portuguese rule in Goa had occurred sporadically from the sixteenth century onwards. These agitations were usually violent and were ruthlessly suppressed. With the start of the non-violent struggle for independence sponsored by Mahatma Gandhi in India, a similar movement was born in Goa, with the formation of the Goa National Congress in 1928 under the leadership of Dr. Tristao Braganza Cunha. However, it was only after the end of World War II that a civil disobedience movement came into being, on the lines of the one launched by Mahatma Gandhi in 1930 in India. This was supported by the leaders of the freedom struggle in India, including Mahatma Gandhi. In The Harijan of 30 June 1946, he wrote,
“I would venture to advise the Portuguese Government of Goato recognize the signs of time and come to honourable terms with its inhabitants rather than function on any treaty that might exist between them and the British Government”.
The Congress Working Committee, in its meeting on 12 August 1946 passed a strong resolution condemning the policies of Portugalin Goa, which had reduced the inhabitants to a state of poverty, forcing them to migrate to other regions in search of a living. It declared that ‘Goa has always been and must inevitably continue to be, a part of India. It must share in the freedom of the Indian people’.1
The struggle for independence gained momentum after India became free of British rule in 1947. During the first couple of years,India had to face many challenges, such as the large-scale migration of people after partition, the police action in Hyderabad and the operations in Jammu and Kashmir. As a result, the country’s leaders could not do much for the people of Goa, who continued the agitation on their own. In June 1948, meetings were held in different parts of Goa. The Goan Police carried out a lathi charge (a lathi is a long bamboo stick, used as a weapon) and arrested the leaders, including Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, a prominent leader of the Socialist Party in India. Though the demonstrations were broken up, it made the people of Goa realize that they did not have even the right of expressing their views peacefully and holding meetings.
After the ceasefire in Kashmir, the Government of India approached the Portuguese Government in 1949 for a peaceful transfer of their enclaves in India in accordance with the wishes of the people, but did not receive any response. Realising that Portugalwas unwilling to grant them freedom, the people continued their peaceful agitation, with the help of Indian nationalist leaders. At the same time, the Government of India made efforts to resolve the issue with the Government of Portugal. However, these efforts had absolutely no effect on the Portuguese Government, which intensified its repressive measures and curtailed civil liberties to crush the movement inside the enclaves. After India became a Republic in January 1950, the French agreed to handover the colony of Pondicherry on the East Coast toIndia. This gave an impetus to the freedom movement in Goa and it was hoped thatPortugal would follow suit. However, these hopes were belied and the attitude of Portugalon the issue remained inflexible.
The Government of India opened a legation in Lisbon in 1950 and suggested to the Portuguese Government to start negotiations for finding a peaceful solution to the Goan problem. The Portuguese Government refused even to discuss the issue and in June 1953, the Indian Mission in Lisbon was closed. There was a dramatic change in the situation in July 1954 when Dadra, a detached Portuguese enclave about 100 miles north of Bombay, was liberated by volunteers of the United Front of Goans. Eleven days later, a similar event occurred at Nagar Haveli, another Portuguese pocket to the east of Daman, separated from it by narrow strip of an Indian territory, where the people rose and overthrew the Portuguese rule. The liberation of these two pockets after 175 years signalled the end of Portuguese colonial rule inIndia.
About a year after the liberation of Dadar and Nagar Haveli, a serious incident brought matters to a head. On 15 August 1955, the eighth anniversary of India’s independence, about 3000 demonstrators entered Goa, Daman and Diu in small groups, which included several women. They were unarmed and wanted to offersatyagrah (a form of non-violent protest, popularized by Mahatma Gandhi) to express their solidarity with the people’s liberation movement in Goa. The Portuguese authorities opened fire on the demonstrators as soon as they entered their territory, killing 22 and wounding 225. Many were arrested and the remainder forcibly evicted. In sympathy with the Indian demonstrators, many Goans hoisted the Indian flag on buildings, distributed handbills and offered satyagrah. The Police opened fire on them too, killing two and brutally assaulting the rest, before arresting them. During the next few days, more satyagrahisentered Goa, many being arrested and the rest being evicted. In protest, the underground nationalists in Goa set fire to some government buildings and police barracks.
The brutal killing of peaceful demonstrators, including several women, generated considerable resentment and anger inIndia, and there were demands on the Government of India to take action against the Portuguese authorities. Conceding that the Portuguese had the right to evict intruders, the Indian Government could do little more than seal the borders to prevent such incidents. This move was criticized by political parties, which blamed the government for sabotaging the nationalist movement in Goa. Meanwhile,Portugal accused India of sending ‘armed’ demonstrators to liberate the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, and demanded the right of free passage through Indian territory for her armed forces in order to re-establish her rule there. The case reached the International Court of Justice at The Hague in 1955. After four years of arguments, the case was finally decided on 12 August 1960. While recognizing the status of the enclaves as Portuguese territory, the Court did not agree to the right of free passage for armed forces, and felt that Portuguese officials could go there after obtaining visas from the Government of India, which now had jurisdiction over the intervening territory. The liberated enclaves remained autonomous territories for some time after the judgment, though requests from the people to merge them with India were continuously being made by the people since their liberation. In August 1961, the Indian Parliament passed two Bills formalizing the merger of Dadra and Nagar Haveli with the Union of India.
The status of Goa was also discussed in the United Nations, when several nations askedPortugal to submit information about Goa and her other colonies, as was obligatory under the UN Charter. Portugal refused, contending that these territories were not colonies but part of metropolitan Portugal. In November 1961, the UN Trusteeship Council passed a resolution condemning Portugal’s refusal and requesting all members to deny Portugal any help that could be used for the subjugation of the people of these colonies. A month earlier, in October 1961, Prime Minister Nehru had confessed during a seminar on Portuguese colonialism that the policy of the Government of India to solve the Goan question by peaceful means had failed. “We have been forced into thinking afresh by the Portuguese – to adopt other methods to solve this problem”, he added. “When and how we will do it cannot be forecast now. But I have no doubt thatGoa will soon be free”. 2
Though events in Goa and on the international stage clearly brought out the futility of further overtures and negotiations with the Portuguese, the Government of India was still reluctant to resort to force to solve the problem. However, the Portuguese themselves provided the spark that lit the conflagration. On17 November 1961, the Portuguese opened fire on the Indian merchant coastal steamer‘Sabarmati’ while she was on its normal course off Anjidiv Island near Karwar, causing injuries to the Chief Engineer. On 25 November 1961, the Portuguese again opened fire from AnjidivIsland and killed a fisherman in a country craft returning along with 15 other boats after a fishing trip. the Indian Government decided to act, and the Army was asked to go in. Two warships of the Indian Navy - the Kirpan and the Rajput - were sent from Bombay to the Karwar coast, on 28 November. On 30 November 1961, the Government took the decision to liberate Goa, and all other areas under Portuguese control, by a combined operation, involving the three Services.
The terrain in Goa favoured the defender, and precluded the use of armour, due to the large number of rivers and inland creeks. The Portuguese had about three battalions of infantry, and one squadron of wheeled armoured cars. The naval element consisted of one frigate, the 'Albuquerque', equipped with 120 mm cannons. There was no air force worth the name, except for a two transport planes, of the Portuguese civil airline TAIP. The total number of soldiers, including Goans serving in Portuguese Forces, was about 5,000 in Goa, and 750 each in Daman and Diu.
THE LIBERATION OF GOA
Planning and Preliminary Actions
Though the Government of India did not issue any formal orders on the subject, the Army had discreetly started taking some actions on its own. Based on newspaper accounts of the unrest in Portuguese Africa and its possible repercussions in India, Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C Southern Command wrote to Army HQ on 28 April 1961, suggesting that he be issued a directive to allow him to make a tentative plan in case military intervention was ever required in Goa, Daman and Diu. Army HQ confirmed that no military action in these territories was contemplated by the Government. Despite this reply, General Chaudhuri felt that it was essential to build up an accurate intelligence picture so that they were not caught napping if it was ever urgently required. His staff discreetly started the process of collecting intelligence. Information from military sources was negligible and so liaison was established with Mr. G.K. Handoo, the special Inspector General, Border Police. This liaison produced good results, particularly on the aspects of topography and communications. In addition to the collation of information, the process of developing an outline appreciation and plan was also begun.
On 29 August 1961, while General Chaudhuri was officiating as the Chief of Army Staff at Delhi, the Defence Minister verbally told him that military action against the Portuguese held territories in India was a distinct probability. An outline plan for such an eventuality was to be prepared, though for the time being, this overall plan was to be made without consulting the other two Services. After receiving these verbal instructions, a suitable directive was also drafted for GOC-in-C Southern Command and put up to the Army Chief when he returned from his tour abroad. General Chaudhuri also returned to his headquarters inPoona and started his planning and reconnaissance of the Goan borders. For reasons of security, only the Chief of Staff and Brigadier General Staff at HQ Southern Command were privy to these preparations.
On 7 October 1961, Army HQ asked the GOC-in-C Southern Command for his appreciation and plan based on a main task, which was to occupy the Portuguese held territories in India with utmost speed. On 24 October 1961, while the formal appreciation and plan were being prepared, the Prime Minister who was in Bombay enroute to the USA sent for the GOC-in-C and asked him for his estimate of the time it would take to occupy Goa, Damanand Diu. General Chaudhuri gave a figure of three days in the event of Portuguese resistance and a considerably shorter period in the event of no resistance or of qualified resistance. On 28 October 1961, while both were returning to Poona after the Armoured Corps Conference in Ahmednagar, Lieutenant General B.M. Kaul, the Chief of General Staff and General Chaudhuri discussed the appreciation and outline plan. It was tentatively agreed that HQ 17 Infantry Division with one or two brigades and 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade would be made available for the operations against Goa. These formations would come from Western and Eastern Commands. For operations againstDaman and Diu, troops from within Southern Command would be used.3
General Chaudhuri submitted his appreciation on 10 November 1961. The decision of the Government to undertake military operations for the liberation of Goa was formally conveyed to the Army on 29 November 1961 and preparations started immediately. A task force under the command of Major General K.P. Candeth was ordered to be assembled for the operation, which was to be conducted under the control of HQ Southern Command. The force earmarked for Goa was to comprise 17 Infantry Division less a brigade; 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade; two armoured regiments; one medium artillery regiment and some engineer units. One infantry battalion (1 Maratha Light Infantry) was nominated forDaman and a composite force comprising 20 Rajput and a company of 4 Madras for Diu, under the command of a brigadier. Major General K.P. Candeth, the Director Artillery at Army HQ was ordered to relieve Major General M. M. Khanna, GOC 17 Infantry Division, who was to proceed to UK to attend a training course. Meanwhile, two warships of the Indian Navy, the Kirpan and the Rajput – had already been sent from Bombay to the Karwar coast on 28 November 1961.
On 29 November 1961, Brigadier Sagat Singh, Commander 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade at Agra received a telephone call from Major General D.K. 'Monty' Palit, the Director of Military Operations at Army HQ, and was asked to rush to Delhi. Sagat commandeered a Dakota of the Paratroopers' Training School, and was in Palit's office in less than an hour. It was here that he learnt about the planned operation for the liberation of Goa and his own role in it. Later in the day, there was a conference in the office of the Chief of General Staff, General Kaul, where the plans were finalized. The operation for the liberation of Goa, code named 'Vijay', was planned for 16 December 1961. General Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C Southern Command, was entrusted with overall responsibility of the task. In order to prevent international intervention and reinforcements from Portugal reaching Goa, it was essential that the operation was quick and decisive. The plan made by General Chaudhuri envisaged a two-pronged attack. The main force, comprising 17 Infantry Division, was to move into Goa from the east, while 50 Parachute Brigade was to mount a subsidiary thrust from the north. Daman and Diu were to be simultaneously tackled by a battalion each, while the Navy was to capture Anjidiv Islandand blockade the ports of Marmugao, Vasco andDaman. The Indian Air Force was assigned the task of destroying the airfield at Dambolim and the wireless station at Bambolim, in addition to providing close support to the ground troops. To ensure that the Indian troops were not held up at the obstacles, a large amount of bridging equipment was grouped with the main column. A para drop by a battalion group of 50 Parachute Brigade was also planned near Panjim, to capture vital bridges before they could be destroyed by the Portuguese.
Sagat was elated on being informed that a battalion group from his brigade would be used in an airborne role. Since time and the riverine obstacles were the main considerations, he suggested that the battalion be dropped by night in area Ponda, so that the water obstacles of rivers Sanquelim, Bicholim, Usgaon and Candepar could be avoided. However, the AOC-in-C Operational Command, who was present, expressed his inability to undertake a night drop. Sagat then suggested that one company be dropped at dawn, another at first light, and the rest of the battalion subsequently by day. This was accepted, and Sagat returned to Agra in high spirits. Before leaving for Delhi, Sagat and the brigade major had devised a code to cover likely tasks so that this could be communicated telephonically as a Warning Order. As a result, the commanding officers were informed the same evening and preparations started. 4
The Warning Order for the operation was issued at 1530 hours on 29 November in the form of a ‘Personal For’ signal from the Chief of Army Staff to the Army Commanders, with copies being endorsed to Major General M.M. Khanna and Brigadier Sagat Singh. The signal bore the precedence FLASH and was signed personally by the Chief of General Staff, General Kaul. The signal is significant because apart from giving the code name of the operation, details of troops, date and time of move (No Move Before 2000 hrs on 2 December) and concentration area (Belgaum), it also gave out the reasons for undertaking the operations in these words:-
“…As a result of recent Portuguese hostile action our nationals, government propose taking certain steps in area ANJIDIV Island (.)Portuguese likely to take retaliatory measures which may compel us to take armed action against their territories in INDIA…”.
According to intelligence reports, the strength of the Portuguese Army in Goa was three infantry battalions comprising about 2,200 ranks. In addition, there were four squadrons of armour equipped with armoured or scout cars and three companies of artillery, each having six 105 mm howitzers. There was some anti aircraft artillery at Dabolim airfield and Marmagao harbour, in addition to some coastal guns at the latter location. In addition to the above, there were about 3,000 armed local police personnel and customs guards in Goa, equipped with mortars and light automatics. The naval complement consisted of three small ships; each armed with three 120 mm cannons and four multiple Pom-Poms. There was no air force worth the name, though the possibility of a few transport planes could not be ruled out. However, in the event of operations being prolonged or adequate warning being given, the Portuguese could reinforce their naval and air force units.
Move to Concentration and Assembly Areas
HQ 17 Mountain Division had been out on a training exercise near Kapurthala that had just concluded on 29 November 1961. The GOC, General Khanna who was on leave, was summoned urgently to Delhi where he was handed a Top Secret directive giving out the role of his division. The same evening, he sent a message from Delhi, ordering the immediate return of all formations and units to their permanent locations and calling all commanders for a conference next morning at 0800 hours at Ambala. After a night-long drive, the move back was completed at 2130 hours on30 November 1961.
As soon as he returned from Delhi, the GOC held a conference where he informed everyone about the impending operation for the liberation of Goa. The concentration areas forGoa, Daman and Diu were Belgaum, Vapi and Una respectively, where the troops taking part were to reach by 11 December 1961. The first train carrying the advance party left Ambala on 2 December. Next morning, Major General K.P. Candeth took over command of 17 Mountain Division from General Khanna and left forPoona for a briefing by the Army Commander. Special military trains continued to move during the next few days and the concentration of troops was completed on 6 December, five days ahead of schedule. This was a remarkable achievement, considering the long rail journey that involved a change from broad to meter gauge at Poona. The vehicles and some of the troops detrained at Poona and completed the rest of the 400 km journey to Belgaum by road. The movement of supplies, ammunition, fuel and bridging equipment, which had to be moved from depots in different parts of the country was completed only around 12 December 1961.
50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade began its move from Agra on 2 December 1961, the major portion moving by rail to and the rest by air to Poona and thence by rail to Belgaum. The brigade headquarters was established at Mile 4 Road Belgaum – Savantvadi immediately on arrival of the brigade commander’s party on 5 December. By the morning of 8 December, the whole brigade had concentrated in the harbour area. On the brigade’s arrival at Belgaum, certain additional units were placed under its command. These were 7 Cavalry less one squadron (Stuarts); B Squadron 8 Cavalry (AMX tanks); P Battery 24 Medium Regiment; 64/45 Light Anti Aircraft Battery; 135 Heavy MortarBattery; 380 Field Company Engineers and 2 Sikh Light Infantry. The last named unit had recently moved to Begumpet from Madraswhere it had been performing garrison duties and had done no collective training for a considerable period. The battalion was also not fully equipped, even lacking boots. Another factor was that being a non-para unit, the newcomers were not imbued with the characteristic esprit-de-corps and élan of the 'red berets'. However, Brigadier Sagat Singh welcomed them, and tried his best to make them feel at home. Being designed for an airborne role, the brigade was woefully short of transport. After much cajoling, they were allotted some Nissan 1 Ton trucks.
On 9 December 1961, GOC 17 Infantry Division briefed his orders group on the impending task. This was followed by the issue of the divisional operation order on 11 December 1961. The operation was to be conducted in two phases. In Phase 1, Ponda was to be captured, while Panjim and Marmagao were to be captured in Phase 2. The advance was to be undertaken two-up on three axes, named Red, Yellow and Blue. The Red Axis (Doda Marg- Assonara – Sanquelim – Usgao – Pilliem) was allotted to 50 Parachute Brigade Group and the Yellow Axis (Anmod – Molem – Pilliem - Ponda) to 17 Infantry Division, with 63 Brigade leading and 48 Brigade in reserve. The Green Axis provided an alternate route to Ponda ahead of Mollem and was to be used by 63 Brigade in addition to the Yellow Axis. Significantly, D Day for the operation was not specified. 5
As the rest of 17 Infantry Division was to follow 63 Brigade on the Yellow Axis on wheels, two sets of move tables were made with different priorities dependent on the delay that was likely to be encountered due to the damage done to the roads and the repair programme of own engineers. The ghat section of the road between the border and Mollem had not been used for the last five or six years. As a result, it was over-grown with thick foliage, forming a canopy. It had precipitous slopes and hairpin bends with the culverts and two small bridges – in fact an ideal demolition country. The road was believed to be extensively cratered, mined and culverts and bridges blown. One move table catered for delay until 1430 hours on D day and the other until last light on D day.
The Army Commander had decided to establish his tactical headquarters at Belgaum to exercise intimate control over the operation. Moving in small parties, Tactical HQ Southern Command was established at Belgaum on 12 December 1961. The same day, HQ 17 Division moved forward to its forward concentration area at Tinaighat. By 13 December, 50 Parachute Brigade had moved to a location close to Savantwadi, after certain bridges had been reinforced by the Engineers. The distance fromBelgaum to Savantwadi was about 100 km, of which about 20 km lay through the narrow and steep sections of the Amboli Ghat, which was quite a challenge for armoured and heavy vehicles. The Engineers also improved the approaches up to the assembly area, which was east of Dodamarg. Bridges that could not be crossed were supplemented with diversions.
On 15 December 1961, the COAS, General P.N. Thapar, accompanied by Lieutenant General P.P. Kumaramangalam, the Adjutant General, and the Army Commander visited 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade, where Brigadier Sagat Singh presented his plan for the operation. At the end of the presentation, the Army Commander expressed the view that the timings were too optimistic, and had reservations about them being adhered to. Sagat then gave the timings in writing, and the party left, after wishing the brigade good luck. On return to his tactical headquarters, the Army Commander conveyed his doubts to his staff. However, Air Vice Marshal E.W. Pinto, the Theatre Air Commander; Major General P.O. Dunn, the Chief of Staff; and Mr. G.N. Handoo, of the Intelligence Bureau, who knew Sagat well, supported him and he was allowed to proceed according to his plan. As it happened, Sagat had already kept a reserve of four hours and was able to remain well ahead of the estimated timings when the operations ended. 6
During his visit, the COAS addressed the troops of 17 Infantry Division and 50 Parachute Brigade and wished them luck. Next day, a Special Order of the Day from the Chief was read out to all ranks. The D Day for the operation was originally 14 December. However, this was postponed twice, for political reasons. Diplomatic efforts were still being made and it was hoped that the United Nations and other countries may act to avert an armed conflict. On 16 December, the Army Commander landed at the airstrip near 8 Cavalry and informed GOC 17 Infantry Division that the D Day would be 18 December. This was later confirmed by a signal giving the code word ‘Bull Dozer’. Troops were ordered to move forward to the assembly area on the afternoon of 16 December. The brigade assembly area of 50 Parachute Brigade was east of Dodamarg, about 50 km from the concentration area at Savantvadi. On the Eastern thrust, 63 and 48 Brigades moved to their assembly areas near Anmod. On 17 December, the order to enter Goa was received through the codeword ‘Varaha’. Patrolling across the border was allowed after last light on 17 December 1961 with a view to liquidating the enemy posts enroute near the border, facilitating further advance and gaining information especially of road communication and state of defences.
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50 Para Bde has been ordered by this hq to move into PANJIM as we could NOT contact you last evening (.) essential you send one bde to occupy MARMAGAO peninsula earliest possible and confirm this has been done
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Although its communication vehicles were stranded all along the ghat section of the Anmod – Mollem road, by 0800 hours on 19 December the main divisional headquarters had assumed control with a relay station vehicle in area Mollem. However, 50 Parachute Brigade was still not in touch. Realizing the urgency of the task of capturing Marmagao at the earliest, and knowing that 48 Infantry Brigade units were still held up East of Mollem, orders were issued to Commander 48 Infantry Brigade to take over 3 Sikh, a battalion of 63 Infantry Brigade halted at Candiapar, and dash down to Panjim. However, the orders had to be cancelled as Panjim had already been captured by troops of 50 Parachute Brigade. The other formations of 17 Infantry Division continued with their tasks.
The task allotted to 63 Infantry Brigade was to capture Margao and Marmagao. The outline plan was for 4 Sikh Light Infantry to lead the advance at 0600 hours on foot across theCandiapar River to Ponda and then via Borim to Margao; 2 Bihar to follow 4 Sikh Light Infantry; and 3 Sikh to reach Borim and await further orders. The leading companies of 4 Sikh Light Infantry waded across the Candiapar River as scheduled and found a few civilian vehicles on the far bank. The battalion reached Borim ferry by 0830 hours without opposition but found the bridge blown. The river here is 600 yards wide. A barge was found and the whole battalion was across by 0930 hours to be greeted by jubilant Goans who were waiting with trucks and cars. The battalion pressed on and by 1030 hours had reached Margao where it occupied vulnerable points and waited for 2 Bihar to pass through as ordered by the brigade commander.
For the advance on 19 December, 2 Biharwas divided into two parties. At 0730 hours two companies with the CO left in mechanical transport by a new lateral route, which joined up with the Green route to Ponda, while the remainder of the battalion waded through theCandiapar River and continued the advance to Ponda on foot. The vehicle column route was bad and both the columns met at Borim at 0930 hours. Having crossed Borim at 1030 hours, the battalion reached Margao at 1230 hours and took the lead from 4 Sikh Light Infantry.
Civilians in Verna informed the leading troops that about 500 Portuguese held a defensive position on the high ground north of the village. C Company was sent in an out flanking move to the left under Captain Bhandari. When they were about 300 yards away, the enemy opened small arms fire on our troops who promptly returned the fire and charged, upon which the enemy surrendered. The bag was 11 officers, 23 sergeants, 91 soldiers and large quantity of arms and equipment. While this was going on, B Company under Major Bose charged the enemy position from the right further in depth and they also surrendered. Their bag was 16 officers, 307 soldiers, 14 armoured cars, 21 jeeps and various other equipments. All this was over by 1430 hours when 4 Sikh Light Infantry was ordered to pass through and proceed to Vasco da Gama.
Starting from Verna at 1445 hours, 4 Sikh Light Infantry reached the area of road junction east of the Dabolim airfield at 1530 hours. By a swift out flanking move, the leading company commander rounded up six enemy officers and over 100 men with huge quantities of arms, ammunition and equipment. The battalion kept up the pace and reached the out skirts of Vasco da Gama at 1600 hours where a large number of Portuguese surrendered. A small party of the enemy was still holding out in the area of the Baina beach near Marmagao. A platoon sent out to deal with them captured 40 of the enemy with a large booty of arms and ammunition. The occupation of the Western tip of the peninsula was thus completed. However due to a breakdown in communication between HQ 63 Infantry Brigade and main divisional headquarters, the fact of capture of Marmagao was not known to the latter until 2300 hours on 19 December 1961.
The third battalion of 63 Infantry Brigade – 3 Sikh - was divided into mounted and unmounted columns and kept in reserve. The marching columns reached Dabolim airfield by 2200 hours on 19 December and the vehicular columns reached Margao by last light. In the early hours of 20 December when Captain R.S. Dahiya was out on a contact patrol with a small party, he rounded up 400 Portuguese soldiers who were hungry and keen to surrender.
After 1600 hours the Governor General of Goa, General Manuel Antonio Vassalo E’ Silva was found at Alparquiros camp in Vasco da Gama and he formally surrendered in the capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to Brigadier K.S. Dhillon, Commander 63 Infantry Brigade at 2030 hours on 19 December 1961. The instrument of surrender was signed in the presence of COs 4 Sikh Light Infantry and 2 Bihar, Lieutenant Colonels R.B. Nanda and K.S. Chadha respectively.
Advance of 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade from the North
The brigade commander, Brigadier Sagat Singh had planned to advance into Goa on two axes. The Red Axis (Dodamarg – Bicholim – Sanquelim – Usgao – Piliem) was allotted to 2 Para while the Maroon Axis (Dodamarg – Assonora – Tivim – Mapuca – Betim) was to be used by 2 Sikh Light Infantry. The brigade headquarters was to follow on the Red Axis. The task of capturing Ponda was given 1 Para which was the only element of the brigade to advance on foot, the rest moving on wheels. To ensure safe initial entry of the brigade into Goa, 1 Para was to secure Ibrampur, Doddumorgu and Maulinguem before the start time on D Day.
To carry out the pre-H Hour operations, 1 Para detailed C Company to secure Ibrampur and Doddumorogu and D Company to occupy Maulinguem by 0230 hours. Ibrampur was occupied without any opposition but Doddumorogu was found to be held by a platoon of infantry and a troop of armoured cars. The Portuguese were inside a building surrounded by trenches and fortified by barbed wire. When the company assaulted the position, they came under heavy fire from the armoured cars and the enemy inside the building. The Company Commander, Major I.R. Kumar, detailed two men to cut the wire and make gaps and also detailed parties to deal with the armoured cars. The attack was driven home, one armoured car being destroyed by a rocket launcher. Portuguese casualties were three killed, two wounded and 24 captured. Own casualty was one killed. Meanwhile D Company occupied Maulinguem, killing six and wounding three Portuguese, at a cost of one Indian soldier wounded.
Another preliminary operation was for the Sanquelim bridge by 2 Para, which is best described in the words of the brigade commander, Brigadier Sagat Singh:-
From a Portuguese map obtained through smugglers by 2 Para, we gathered information that they had constructed a 110-foot single span RCC bridge over the river flowing by the eastern boundary of the Sanquelim town. I felt strongly that if we could capture the bridge intact, it would speed up 2 Para's advance. We worked out a careful plan. A company of 2 Para led by Major Uthaya set off on man-pack basis after last light on the night of December 15/16. He was guided by seasoned smugglers who knew their clandestine tracks across country. The tasks given to Major Uthaya were to capture the bridge intact; if not, to find out a crossing place across the river. The company got to their forming up place on the eastern end of the bridge. As they started crawling forward, trouble began in the form of incessant barking of dogs. Though the Portuguese map had not shown it, some hutments of the labourers who had worked on the bridge construction had settled at the eastern end. Men of 2 Para crawled carefully forward a little at a time but the dogs would not give up.
The Portuguese guards became alert and suspicious. As our men were preparing to charge, the Portuguese blew up the demolition charges and scurried towards Usgaon. Major Uthaya was able to locate and mark a crossing place at which all vehicles, tanks and guns got through without difficulty. I can never forget the scene of Major Uthaya meeting me at the Sanquelim end of the bridge with tears rolling down his eyes and in choked voice telling me, "Sorry. I have failed you." -meaning that he had not got the bridge intact. Actually, the mission was a great success. The crossing place enabled us to maintain the momentum of our advance in motor transport. What Major Uthaya did not realize at the time was that he had prevented the Portuguese from firing all the demolition charges affixed to the long single span. They could only fire the charges in the demolition chambers at either end of the single l10-foot span. In the aftermath, the span was lifted by marine jacks and with additions to the abutments on either side; the bridge was re-commissioned economically and in a short time. I have narrated this in some detail not only to commend the performance of the 2 Para Company but to say that in war, howsoever you might plan in detail, there would be imponderables (like barking of dogs at night) to contend with 8.
Another reason for the loss of surprise that resulted in failure to capture the SanquelimBridge was the announcement by All India Radio at 0100 hours that Indian troops would soon be entering Goa. Had the radio announcement been delayed until the morning, perhaps the bridge would not have been blown.
On 18 December, troops of 2 Para started moving out from the forward assembly area at 4 a.m. The advance was held up as soon as it started, due to a damaged culvert near the abandoned Portuguese customs post en route to the start point. Vehicles could negotiate it with great difficulty and the AMX tanks were unable to cross it. The culvert was quickly strengthened with steel decking and the move forward resumed. The vanguard company crossed the start point at the given time and the advance continued. The rate of advance was very slow owing to darkness and the difficult nature of the track especially at the nullah crossings. By first light, the vanguard had reached Corpol, where they met C Company 1 Para which was escorting a Portuguese prisoner captured earlier. Thereafter, the going got slightly better and the speed of advance increased. At approximately 0730 hours a Portuguese armoured car was seen by the vanguard company on the track. However, before any action could be taken it turned round and sped away towards Bicholim. Unfortunately, the AMX tanks were approximately 1000 yards to the rear. At 0830 hours the vanguard cleared Bicholim where the bridge was found demolished. However, the river was crossed by a ford immediately to the north of the bridge. A good tarmac road was now available and the advance was resumed at a good speed, with a view to linking up with the company at Sanquelim which was causing some anxiety, its whereabouts not known to the battalion. The vanguard established contact with C Company on the outskirts of Sanquelim at 1030 hours. As both bridges had been blown, the vanguard was guided to a ford through which it crossed and resumed its advance to Usgao. The crossing at the ford took considerable time as the tanks of 7 Cavalry and 8 Cavalry were also using it and there were frequent breakdowns. C Squadron of 7 Cavalry, which was acting as mobile troops, had moved on to the Red Axis, ahead of the vanguard, from the area of Maulinguem.
The mobile troops and the vanguard reached Usgao at 1140 hours to find the bridge over River Madei blown. The river was a formidable water obstacle, 600 feet wide and unfordable. The banks on either side of the bridge were reported to be mined. However, with adequate caution, a landing place was reconnoitred south of the bridge. Two country boats were immediately acquired for ferrying troops who had now dismounted from vehicles and the CO decided to resume the advance on foot from the far bank. It was decided to build rafts to ferry jeeps which would be utilized to carry two detachments 106 mm RCL, one section MMG and one troop of heavy mortars. Work on construction of improvised rafts commenced and officers were dispatched to commandeer barges and landing ship tanks which were reported in the area. Troops started crossing the river in boats at midday. By 1330 hours, B and D companies and the CO’s party had crossed and were on their way to Ponda, which was secured by A Company at 1345 hours.
On arrival at Ponda, it was found that the Portuguese had set fire to their equipment and baggage and some buildings were burning. Hooligans were seen looting the barracks. Immediately a platoon each was posted to the three army barracks in the town and the fire was brought under control. As more troops arrived, guards were put on various public utilities like petrol pumps, municipal offices, post offices, police station and the administrator’s office. The bazaar area was patrolled and unruly crowds dispersed. Meanwhile C Company, which was at Sanquelim, was lifted in vehicles and moved to Usgao to rejoin the battalion, leaving behind one platoon for garrison duties. The CO arrived at Ponda at 1430 hours. Accompanied by the Second-in-Command and a few officers, he proceeded to reconnoitre the ferry site at Unde where a large number of barges were reported to be moored, and the bridge at Banasterim. At Unde, they found six large iron ore barges, each of which could carry 500 men in addition to two or three jeeps. The ferry owners’ agents and drivers were warned to stay with their ferries and be prepared to move at short notice during night 18/19 December 1961.
It was now dark and the party went towards the Banasterim bridge from Ponda by a detour. The bridge at Mardol had been blown and the nullah in the immediate vicinity was not easily fordable. Another bridge had been cratered but with a little engineer assistance could be made fit for transport. The CO returned to Ponda at approximately 2030 hours where he met the brigade commander who had arrived from Candiapar River and apprised him about the ferry at Unde and the state of bridges on road Ponda – Banasterim. Brigadier Sagat informed them that 1 Para had reached Banasterim and ordered the battalion to send out a contact patrol. Contact was established with rear elements of 1 Para at 0730 hours next morning, the battalion having moved towards Panjim earlier. 9
Tasked to advance on the Maroon Axis (Dodamarg – Assonora – Tivim – Mapuca – Betim), 2 Sikh Light Infantry started on time but was delayed by approximately two hours due to obstacles encountered inside the border and crossed the start point at 0900 hours on 18 December 1961. A Squadron of 7 Cavalry and a troop of B Squadron of 8 Cavalry led the advance. The advance was rapid until they reached Assonora, where the bridge was found to be demolished. The mobile troops reported the presence of eight tanks on the far bank and exercised great caution in pursuing the advance. With the engineer resources at hand and local labour and material available, the force commenced crossing the river by a diversion at 1145 hours. At 1300 hours the column reached Tivim where the bridge was again found demolished and a diversion was taken via Colvale. At 1400 hours the head of the column hit the Pernim – Mapuca road where numerous anti-tank mines were encountered. Considerable time was spent in disarming and removing these mines. However, by 1600 hours the column got well under way and reached Mapuca at 1700 hours.
One company group was detached at Mapuca to round up the Portuguese personnel still around, creating confidence amongst the public and affording protection to the town. The route from Mapuca to Betim was mined at places and obstacles had been created by demolishing culverts and felling trees. By 1745 hours the entire column reached Betim. Since permission to cross the creek at Betim had not been granted, the column was split into groups and went into night harbour. At about 200 hours a priest from Panjim came in a boat to theharbour of A Squadron 7 Cavalry with a letter written in Portuguese, purporting to be an offer of surrender from the military commander of Panjim. Major S.S. Sidhu, the squadron commander, took the letter to Lieutenant Colonel Cherian, CO 2 Sikh Light Infantry, who declined to cross the creek to accept the surrender at Panjim as he had not been able to contact the brigade commander to get his clearance.
On returning to the harbour, Major Sidhu came to know that his men had captured two men who claimed to be locals from a nearby village, which fell on the route that the squadron was to take next morning. Wishing to confirm if the men were telling the truth, Major Sidhu decided to reconnoitre up to the village. Accompanied by four officers, three OR and the two prisoners, Major Sidhu left in a Dodge 15 cwt. truck at 2230 hours. On reaching the village, the prisoners were released after they were identified by the residents. However, another local informed Major Sidhu that about 50 to 60 nationalist prisoners in the Aguada Fort were likely to be murdered during the night by the five or six Portuguese soldiers who were guarding them.
Deciding to rescue the prisoners, Major Sidhu immediately left for the Aguada Fort, about seven miles away, accompanied by the informer. The party reached the fort at about 2330 hours and found the gate closed. Major Sidhu asked the sentry to call his commander, telling him that the Portuguese authorities in Panjim had decided to surrender. The Portuguese suddenly opened fire with automatics, mortars and grenades. Major Sidhu and his party were taken by surprise but returned the fire. However, they were overwhelmed and suffered heavy casualties. A light machine gun burst hit Captain V.K. Sehgal who died instantly. The truck was loaded with ammunition which exploded, setting it on fire. Major Sidhu was also hit and ran back about 100 yards where he was caught in a medium machine gun burst. Two officers and one OR who were not seriously injured walked back to the harbour, reaching there at about 0330 hours. A troop of AMX tanks, a troop of Stuarts and two rifle troops were immediately dispatched to the fort, reaching there at 0530 hours. After a few bursts of machine gun fire, the Portuguese hoisted the white flag and surrendered. Major Sidhu and Captain V.K. Sehgal were killed in operation, with two officers and two OR being seriously wounded10.
The third battalion of 50 Parachute Brigade, 1 Para started from the assembly area at 0500 hours and arrived at Matna post of own border police at 0600 hours. After halting for an hour, when 2 Para was approaching Maulinguem, 1 Para also left for the same place, arriving there at approximately 0800hours. The battalion had to halt for another hour awaiting the success signal indicating occupation of Bicholim and allowing the brigade column to pass through. To save time, the battalion was allowed to march, keeping the track clear for vehicles, without waiting for the entire column to pass through. This enabled the battalion to reach Bicholim at about 1030 hours. After a short halt outside the town, the battalion marched to Piligao ferry reaching there at 1245 hours.
There were no local boats at the ferry site when the battalion arrived, but after a while, a large boat appeared followed by a small Z craft. In the meantime, two engineer vehicles fetched up with four storm boats. After the guns were in position to give fire support, the first company was ordered to go across. As the first company was about to shove off, it was learned from the local civilians that the ferry site on the opposite bank was mined. Actual reconnaissance on the far side proved that the site was suitable for the infantry but a diversion had to be made for vehicles to avoid the mines. This was done by the engineers with great speed. Three jeeps carrying 106 mm RCL guns were landed and the advance towards Banasterim bridge started at 1630 hours. On reaching the Banasterim bridge at 1745 hours, it was found blown and there being no boats, the battalion took up position on the eastern side. Shortly afterwards, a message was received from brigade headquarters that the Army Commander would visit the unit next morning and they were to stay put in that position till further orders.
Capture of Panjim by 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade
At about 2100 hours, the Chief of Staff Southern Command spoke to the brigade major of 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade who informed him about the latest disposition of the forward troops, which was the general line Betim, Piligao, Banasterim and Ponda. Thereafter at about 1000 hours the Army Commander spoke to the brigade major, informing him that the Government of Goa was assembling in Panjim at 0800 hours next morning to finalize the terms of surrender. He desired that Indian troops should be on the outskirts of Panjim and ordered the immediate advance by 1 Para and 2 Sikh Light Infantry into Panjim. The Army Commander wanted this to be conveyed to the GOC 17 Infantry Division also. However, as wireless communications were not through, this was communicated to the duty officer at Tactical HQ Southern Command, who sent a special officer courier to convey the message to GOC 17 Infantry Division.
In his report General Chaudhuri has explained the reasons for his decision, as under:-
On the evening of 18 December, Tactical HQ Southern Command discovered that both 63 Infantry Brigade of 17 Infantry Division and 50 (Indep) Para Brigade had been ordered by GOC Task Force to harbour for the night, and that the next morning the GOC intended to advance his reserve brigade, 48 Infantry Brigade, through the Para Brigade on to Velha Goa and Panjim. This action had probably been taken as communications within 17 Infantry Division had not been working too well and the GOC wanted to make sure of fresh troops for the advance. The GOC-in-C Southern Command, in his capacity as the overall Commander, felt however that in view of the very small resistance offered by the Portuguese there was no reason why the advance could not immediately continue, and with the same troops, after a small break for reorganization. In any case if the reserve brigade was to pass through the Para Brigade and then continue the advance into Panjim there would be a further delay. It must be remembered that 48 Infantry Brigade which was in reserve was still in the Anmod area and had not been moved behind the Para Brigade. He accordingly ordered the advance to be resumed as soon as possible, during the night, and by the troops already in the lead. Because Signal communications were still poor, HQ 50 (Indep) Para Brigade was informed of this decision, with some difficulty in the early hours of 19 December 11.
Based on the orders received from the Army Commander, 1 Para and 2 Sikh Light Infantry were ordered to cross the Banasterim and the Mandovi Rivers respectively and advance on to Panjim from the north and the east. At 0730 hours two companies of 2 Sikh Light Infantry crossed into Panjim in local ferries and secured the police headquarters, custom house, governor general’s residence, secretariat and military camp. Except for some rifle fire and two automatics which were later neutralized, no major opposition was encountered. The civilian population collected in large numbers. Their enthusiasm was so great that the movement of troops to their objectives was delayed by about an hour and a half. Meanwhile the forward elements of 1 Para also arrived. During the day the bulk of the Portuguese were rounded up and put inside prisons.
Being unable to procure any boats and the ferry not operating, 1 Para decided to cross the Banasterim River on their own. Two companies were ordered to swim across on two equipment rafts. One of the hastily prepared rafts sank, taking with it a rifle and a sten. In the meantime, the Z craft also arrived along with a couple of small boats and this hastened the crossing of the battalion. The rest of the story is related by the CO, Lieutenant Colonel Sucha Singh, VrC, MC who wrote:-
Realizing that the show was up and that I had very little time if I wanted to win the race for Panjim, I commandeered a civilian car and two trucks which had arrived on the far side with passengers apparently to welcome Indian troops. Collecting whatever men who had put their uniforms on from the two companies who swam across and my battery commander I started in that car and two trucks for Panjim. I left instructions that other companies will follow me as they come across using whatever civilian transport was available. It is worth mentioning that civilians were so enthusiastic that they were begging to be given a chance to lift troops in their vehicles.
At about 0830 hours on December 19, I arrived at Governor-General's Secretariat (The Palace), occupied it, and placed a guard there. The civilians accorded a very enthusiastic welcome and what is more it was spontaneous. Then we made for the ferry crossing in order to contact 2 Sikh Light Infantry in case they were across. When I reached the police station I noticed that 2 Sikh Light Infantry troops had entered that place.
Lt Col Sucha Singh of 50 (I) Parachute Brigade accepts surrender of Portuguese troops at Bambolim, Goa – 19 Dec 1961
Even as 1 Para and 2 Sikh Light Infantry were vying for the prize of Panjim, 2 Para, which was in Ponda, was preparing to cross into Velha Goa. The divisional commander visited Ponda at approximately 0900 hours and went round the town accompanied by Commander 50 Parachute Brigade. Soon after his departure, information was received that 1 Para had entered Panjim. Hence the proposed advance to Velha Goa was called off. The battalion was ordered to take over the administrative responsibility of Ponda. At 1130 hours Brigadier Sagat Singh left Ponda escorted by a platoon from C Company, taking the ferry route from Unde to Panjim.
General Chaudhuri accompanied by Air Vice Marshal E.W. Pinto and the Chief of Staff landed by a helicopter at Banasterim at 0900 hours on 19 December 1961. On being told that a battalion of 50 Parachute Brigade had already reached Panjim, he decided to drive into the town. After crossing the Banasterim by ferry, he drove straight down to Velha Goa from where he passed a wireless message to the Chief of the Army Staff giving the news of the fall of Goa. He stopped just short of Panjim to visit a hospital where the Portuguese wounded in action were being treated. Mr. Sardesai, the nationalist leader was also admitted there for treatment. The Army Commander then drove to the Secretariat where he was mobbed by the joyous civilian population. They wanted him to fly the Indian National Flag on the Secretariat building which he did.
The Army Commander then drove to the Broadcasting House, met the Goan Secretary-General in the latter’s house and then went to the Portuguese officers’ mess where he accepted the surrender from the local military commander. Thereafter, he expressed a desire to see the Mandovi Hotel, but due to small arms fire still continuing in the vicinity he decided to go back to Belgaum. On the way he stopped for a while at Velha Goa to visit the church of St. Francis Xavier. He took off for Belgaum in the helicopter at 1320 hours.
The COAS, Gen PN Thapar (far right) with deposed Portuguese
Governor General Manual Antonis Vassalo E’ Silva (seated
centre) at a POW facility in Vasco Da Gama, Goa
Contrary to popular perception, the Portuguese did not surrender their enclaves without a fight. In Goa, the opposition was limited, but in Daman and Diu they put up stiff resistance. After the wireless station had been destroyed, communications between Goa and the other enclaves had been disrupted, and this may have accounted for the spirited defence put up by them. However, both Daman and Diu were occupied on 19 December, with the support of the Air Force, as well as the Navy, accompanied by heavy artillery shelling. This resulted in several casualties among troops as well as civilians.
DAMAN
The Portuguese enclave of Daman lay at the entrance of the Gulf of Cambay about 100 miles north of Bombay and had an area of 22 square miles. A tarmac road connected it to the former settlement of Nagar Haveli. The Portuguese strength in Daman was estimated to be three companies consisting of 360 all ranks. (It was later found to be an underestimation). In addition there were some police and customs outposts along the border contiguous withIndia. The task of liberating Daman was given to 1 Maratha Light Infantry, which was located at Poona. The CO was Lieutenant Colonel S.J.S. Bhonsle. The original plan was to commence the operation in Daman some time after Goa had been entered, but it was subsequently decided to launch it simultaneously. The unit was allotted one battery of field guns, an air control team and two Auster aircraft for air observation post tasks. The Navy was to assist by blockading theport of Daman and the Air Force would provide some pre-arranged sorties for close air support. The battalion was given a Signals detachment equipped with a WS 399 for communicating with Tactical HQ Southern Command atBelgaum and a VHF set for ground to air communications.
The battalion moved from Poona by train on 12 December and arrived at Vapi in the early hours of the morning of 13 December, detraining silently so as not to cause alarm among the local population. The next few days were spent in reconnoitring the border and spreading a rumour through the local police and civil officials that the force that had arrived was only an advance party, to be built up to a brigade supported by armour. As a deception measure, a platoon accompanied by a party from the State Reserve Police was to threaten Moti Daman from the south and liquidate Portuguese outposts on that side. On 17 December, the battalion was informed that D Day for the operation was 18 December and they could commence the offensive. Two hours aftermidnight, two companies advanced towards their objectives, the flying control tower and Post 175. Both companies captured their objectives, with minor casualties. However, surprise had been lost and the Portuguese were ready to retaliate.
After a rocket attack by the Air Force on the Big Fort at first light on 18 December, the operations commenced for the capture of Nani Daman. However, the Portuguese offered stiff resistance, bringing down fire on the attacking troops with medium machine guns, mortars and artillery. By the end of the day, the two attacking companies had made little progress, and the CO asked them to firm in for the night, deciding to move up the reserve companies for a fresh attack next morning. At about 0745 hours on 19 December two Mystere aircraft fired rockets at the Big Fort and some guns near a temple inside the town. Half an hour later, the Portuguese surrendered. The Governor, Antonio Jose Da Costa Pinto, who was himself wounded, signed an unconditional surrender at 0830 hours. By 1300 hours the town was occupied by Indian troops. About 600 white soldiers, seven 25 pounder guns, eight 81-mm mortars and large amount of small arms and ammunition was captured.
Unlike, in Goa, the local population did not greet the Indian troops, being unsure of their conduct. Being used to atrocities at the hands of the Portuguese, they expected similar treatment from the victors. It was only after a few days that they began coming out of their houses and going about their daily business. The Indian casualties in the operation were one JCO and three OR killed; and one JCO and 13 OR wounded. The Portuguese casualties were 10 killed and two wounded. The total number of prisoners was 853, including 24 officers, 544 soldiers, nine Portuguese police, 268 local police and eight Portuguese civilians.18
DIU
The island of Diu lies off the southern extremity of the Kathiawar peninsula separated from it by a narrow creek. It was the smallest of the Portuguese possessions in India, having an area of about 38 square kilometres and a population of 14,280 according to the 1960 census. Like Daman, the strength of troops holding Diu was estimated to be 360, which again turned out to be an underestimation. The task of capturing Diu was given to Brigadier Jaswant Singh, Commander 112 Infantry Brigade, which was located at Ahmedabad. The troops allotted to him were 20 Rajput; a company of 4 Madras; and an air control team from Air Force station Jamnagar. The Navy was to support the operation by positioning the cruiser I.N.S. Delhi off the island of Diu, who would be prepared to engage targets but fire in close support of troops. At the Diu theatre, Lt Col Bhupinder Singh, CO of 20 Rajput (Jodhpur) was told to capture Diu, a small island just 39 square km in size located at the southern coast of the Saurashtra peninsula. The unit concentrated at Una near Diu by December 17, 1961. Patrols were sent to the village of Kob and beyond to observe the pattern of the tides, phase of the moon and the likely crossing places on the creek, after which it was decided to cross the creek from the northern side of the island. The operation was planned in two phases. In phase one the Diu airfield was to be captured to block the advance of the Portuguese and to stop any reinforcements from coming in. In phase two the entire island was to be captured. In consonance with the plans the unit started its final preparation. The Air Force would provide limited air support in the form of some pre-arranged sorties from Jamnagar. Communications for the operation were provided by 112 Infantry Brigade Signal Company. In addition to being an outstation on the brigade command net, 20 Rajput was to have a direct link with Tactical HQ Southern Command at Belgaum. For this purpose, a Signals detachment equipped with one WS 399 would accompany 20 Rajput. A wireless link would also be established with INS Delhi. For air support communications, a ground to air link between the aircraft and the air control team that would accompany the battalion was provided, in addition to a link to the IAF station Jamnagar.19
According to the operation orders, 20 Rajput, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bhupinder Singh, was to carry out an assault crossing of the tidal creek at low tide south of Kob at night and then move on to capture Diu airfield, followed by Diu town. An hour before the assault by 20 Rajput, C Company of 4 Madras under Major C.W Curtis was to capture Gogla on the mainland near the eastern border of Diu opposite the citadel, and then await further orders. The troops were to concentrate at Una by 15 December 1961. The force commenced its move from Ahmedabad on 13 December.
Moving in three stages, via Rajkot and Veraval, they arrived at Una on 15 December 1961. Next evening, Mr. Bernardo, the Police Commissioner of Diu met Mr. Jadeja, the Deputy Superintendent of Police of Junagadh and told him:
“We know that we would be defeated but we will fight. We hope you will treat us nicely when we lose”.
At 2100 hours that night, All India Radio broadcast a distorted version of Mr. Bernardo’s conversation, announcing that the Portuguese inDiu were ready to surrender. Shortly afterwards, the Army Commander spoke on telephone to the brigade commander, who gave him the correct version. On 17 December the codeword for commencement of operations against Diu was received from Tactical HQ Southern Command. At 0130 hours on 18 December, C Company 4 Madras launched the assault on Gogla. However, the enemy brought down heavy fire from small arms and 25-pounder guns on the attacking troops, who did not have any artillery to counter it. After a bitter fight, the company was forced to withdraw at 0400 hours. The second attack at 0630 met the same fate and several men were wounded.
Again, during the wee hours of December 18, 1961, ‘A’ and ‘C’ Coys launched their boats and phase one of the operation commenced. As the companies reached the middle of the creek the Portuguese on Diu opened fire with two MMGs and two LMGs, capsizing some of the Rajput boats.
Major Mal Singh along with five men pressed on his advance and crossed the creek. On reaching the far bank he and his men assaulted the LMG trenches at Fort-De-Cova and silenced them. The Portuguese MMG fire from another position wounded the officer and two of his men. However, with the brave efforts of company Havildar Major Mohan Singh and two other men, the three wounded were evacuated to shore and safety. As dawn approached the enemy increased the intensity of fire and the battalion’s water crossing equipment suffered extensive damage. As a result the CO had to order the battalion to fall back to Kob village by first light. Soon after dawn, the Indian Air Force was requisitioned and they bombed the island of Diu. Sitting on the home bank the troops could see the enemy ammunition, petroleum dumps and water reservoirs being destroyed by the bombers. Fort-De-Cova, Secho and Fort-De-Mar, which were the Portuguese strong points, were heavily damaged. The Indian naval ship Delhi, which was positioned on the eastern edge of Diu island, also joined in and took on targets at Fort-De-Mar and the citadel.
Later that evening ‘B’ company, which had now relieved ‘C’ company of 4 Madras at Gogis, destroyed other enemy positions with rockets and six pounder guns. The Portuguese finally gave up their resistance and indicated their willingness to surrender. Their emissaries were brought to the battalion headquarters for formal talks and on December 19 by noon the Portuguese formally laid down their arms. In this swift action the battalion took 403 Portuguese as prisoners, which included the Lieut-Governor of the island along with 18 officers and 43 sergeants. For their gallant action Major Mal Singh and Sepoy Hakam Singh were awarded Ashok Chakra (Class III).
The attempt by 20 Rajput to force the crossing was delayed due to the long march over soft and marshy ground, leading to loss of surprise. Two companies launched their improvised boats in the creek opposite at 0230 hours, an hour after the attack by the Madrassi Company. As both companies reached the middle of the creek, the Portuguese opened up with medium and light machine guns, sinking two of the four boats. Two men were killed and 15 wounded including one of the company commanders. The crossing was abandoned at 0500 hours and the troops had to return to the home bank.
Realizing that it would be difficult to counteract the enemy’s defensive fire without artillery support, a message was flashed to I.N.S.Delhi, indicating the targets that needed to be neutralized. The Air Force also started engaging targets after first light. On being informed of the situation, the Army Commander directed that no attempt should be made to cross the creek during day. The Navy and Air Force should be asked to engage Diu Fort and the coastline opposite Gogla, which could then be captured at night. This proved to be quite effective and by evening the enemy guns fell silent. At about 0845 hours a Portuguese officer came over with a message from the Governor of Diu offering to surrender with a request that all Portuguese nationals be permitted to seek protection in Brazilian embassy. The message was relayed to the Army Commander who directed that only an unconditional surrender was to be accepted. The Portuguese were informed at 2130 hours that if they did not surrender unconditionally by 0900 hours next day, the attacks would start again. At 0830 hours on 19 December 1961 the Governor agreed to surrender unconditionally and Indian troops began to enter Diu. At a ceremony held at 1100 hours the Governor of Diu personally surrendered to Brigadier Jaswant Singh, with 16 officers, 43 sergeants and 333 soldiers laying down their arms. The Portuguese casualties in the operation were one killed and 22 wounded. The Indian casualties were eight killed and 17 wounded.
While the Portuguese did not offer any determined resistance in Goa, their garrisons in Daman and Diu put up a stiff fight before surrendering. A likely explanation of this is that the authorities in Goa lost touch with these enclaves and thus they could not pass on to them the instructions to cease resistance. All these three operations were classic inter-services joint operations where speed, secrecy and well co-ordinated actions of the Indian Army, Navy and the IAF played handsome dividends, thus assuring total success in all spheres.
Overall in Operation
Before the operations had started, there had been considerable speculation about the parachute brigade, and its chances of success in a ground role. In fact, Air Vice Marshal Pinto and Mr. Handoo, the Director of IB, had started a betting book, and wagers were made on the timings that the paratroopers had set for themselves. After the surrender, when Pinto came to Panjim with Chaudhury, he told Sagat that thanks to him, he had lost five hundred rupees. The Army Commander had lost all three bets. Another interesting side light of the Goa operations was the propaganda, about Indian troops being barbaric and indisciplined, which the Portuguese authorities had been spreading, with the hope of hardening the resolve of their troops. In fact, this had exactly the opposite effect. After the surrender, when 1 Para arrived at Altinho military camp, they found a large number of Portuguese officers and soldiers in their vests and underpants, cowering with fright. When asked the reason for their strange attire, they stated that they had been told that Indian troops would kill anyone of them found in uniform. Lieut Colonel Sucha Singh, VrC, MC, and his men had a good laugh.
Though the result of the operations in Goa was along expected lines, the speed of the Indian advance surprised many observers. The credit for this goes to Sagat, and his troops, who exceeded their brief, and managed to reach Panjim, which they had not been asked to do. The fact that 17 Infantry Division, in spite of the vastly superior resources at their disposal, and almost no opposition from the enemy, could make little headway, goes to show that the going was not easy. If the paratroopers succeeded, it was because of better fighting spirit, morale and leadership. The ability to take risks, and seize fleeting opportunities is the hall mark of a successful military leader, and Sagat proved beyond doubt that he had these qualities in ample measure. The failure of Indian troops, barely a year afterwards when facing the Chinese, only underlined the point that irrespective of the fighting capabilities of the soldier, it is the quality of leadership which tilts the balance, in war.
By the middle of June 1962, 50 Para Brigade was back in Agra. One day, Sagat was in the Clarkes Shiraz Hotel, in civilian clothes. Also present was a group of American tourists, who kept looking at him intently. Finally, one of them came up to him and asked him if he was Brigadier Singh. Sagat answered in the affirmative, and then asked the American how he had recognised him. The American replied that they had recently visited Portugal, and had seen his photograph in several cafes and restaurants, with the caption that anyone capturing him and handing him over to the Portuguese Government would be given a reward of ten thousand dollars. Sagat had a hearty laugh, and offered to be captured, but the Americans declined, since they said they were not going back to Lisbon.
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| 1961 Soviet poster showing the Indians kicking the Portuguese out of Goa with the caption "Colonialism is doomed everywhere" |
Though for the troops taking part, Operation Vijay had been a full fledged military operation, the Indian Government called it a police action. Several officers, including Sagat, were recommended for gallantry awards, but Krishna Menon, who was the Defence Minister, ruled that since it was a police action, no awards could be given. Of course, the rest of the World was not fooled by this terminology. Many years later, when Sagat was commanding 4 Corps, B.K. Nehru, who was the Governor of Assam, told him an interesting story. In 1961, Nehru was the Indian ambassador in Washington. After the liberation of Goa, he met President Kennedy, to explain the circumstances which had forced the Indian Government to undertake the operation. Kennedy told Nehru that he understood that India had to do what they did, for geo-political reasons. What he did not understand was the manner in which the Indian Government tried to justify a military operation as a police action, and at the same time went on preaching non violence, to all and sundry. He laughed, and said that it was like a priest being caught in a brothel.
CONCLUSION
The liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu in 1961 was an important landmark in the history of post independence India. Though it cannot be termed a major operation in military terms – the overwhelming superiority of Indian troops made it an unequal contest, with the outcome foregone – it was nevertheless important for the Indian Army. Being the first conclusive military victory after 1947, it imbued the public with confidence in the prowess of the armed forces. The swiftness of the operation and the finesse with which it was conducted came in for praise from all quarters.
ENDNOTES
(This chapter is largely based on the official history published by the History Division, Ministry of Defence viz. P.N. Khera’s, Operation Vijay – The Liberation of Goa and Other Portuguese Colonies in India; Historical Report of 50 Independent Parachute Brigade on Operation ‘Vijay’; Report on Operation ‘Vijay’ by Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C Southern Command; unit histories and personal accounts).
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